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Summary 
The Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission was established in 1975, and reestablished in June 1976 as a 
Subcommission of the newly formed Code Commission, with the responsibility to present a comprehensive 
revision of Alaska’s criminal code for consideration by the Alaska State Legislature. Tentative Draft, Part 4, is 
composed of nine articles of the Revised Criminal Code: attempt and related offenses (part 2); arson, criminal 
mischief, and related offenses (part 2); business and commercial offenses; escape and related offenses; 
offenses relating to judicial and other proceedings; obstruction of public administration; general provisions; 
prostitution and related offenses; and gambling offenses. Commentary following each article is designed to 
aid the reader in analyzing the effect of the draft Revised Code on existing law and also provides a section-by-
section analysis of each provision of the draft Revised Code. Appendices include derivations of each provision 
of the Code and amendments to the gambling provisions of Title 5 of the Alaska Statutes. 
Additional information 
As of 1975, Alaska’s criminal laws were based primarily on Oregon criminal statutes as they existed at the 
close of the nineteenth century, with new statutes added and old statutes amended over the succeeding 75 
years by Alaska territorial and state legislatures in a piecemeal approach to revision. This resulted in a 
criminal code containing outdated statutes, obsolete terminology, a number of overly specific statutes, a  
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haphazard approach to mens rea (the culpable mental state with which a defendant must perform an act in 
order to be convicted of a crime) and the lack of a coherent, rational sentencing structure. 
The Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission was established in 1975 with the responsibility to present a 
comprehensive revision of Alaska’s criminal code for consideration by the Alaska State Legislature. (The 
Commission was reestablished in June 1976 as a Subcommission of the newly formed Code Commission.) 
Staff services for the Criminal Code Revision Commission and Criminal Code Revision Subcommission were 
provided by the Criminal Justice Center at University of Alaska, Anchorage (John Havelock, project executive 
director; Barry Jeffrey Stern, reporter/staff counsel; Sheila Gallagher, Reporter/Staff Counsel; and Peter Smith 
Ring, research director). The tentative draft proposed by the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission was 
substantially amended by the Alaska State Legislature prior to its approval as the Revised Alaska Criminal 
Code in June 1978 (effective January 1, 1980). 
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INTRODUCTION TO TENTATIVE DRAFT, PART 4 
Tentative Draft, Part 4, is composed of nine 
articles of the Revised Criminal Code - attempt and related 
offenses, part 2; arson, criminal mischief and related offenses, 
part 2; business and commercial offenses; escape and related 
offenses; offenses relating to judicial and other proceedings; 
obstruction of public administration; general provisions; 
prostitution and related offenses; and gambling offenses. 
Tentative Draft, Part 3, was distributed in April 
and was composed of five articles in the Offenses Against 
Property chapter of the Revised Criminal Code - theft and 
related offenses, burglary and criminal trespass, arson and 
related offenses, forgery and related offenses and general 
provisions. 
Tentative Draft, Part 2, was distributed in March 
and was comprised of seven articles of the Revised Criminal 
Code - general principles of criminal liability; partices to 
crime; justification; attempt and related offenses, part l; 
robbery; bribery and related offenses and perjury and related 
offenses. 
Tentative Draft, Part 1, was distributed in February 
and was comprised of four articles contained in the Offenses 
Against the Person chapter of the Revised Criminal Code -
criminal homicide, assault and related offenses, kidnapping 
and related offenses and 'sexual offenses. 
Commentary follows each article in the Tentative 
Draft and is designed to aid the reader in analyzing the 
1 .
effect of the Revised Code on existing law. The Commentary 
also provides a section-by-section analysis of each provision 
of the Revised Code. All references in the Commentary to 
Tentative Draft provisions contain the letters TD before the 
usual AS cite. 
The final part of the Tentative draft will be published 
in late December. 
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CHAPTER 31. ATTEMPT AND RELATED OFFEL'ISES. 
[Section 
100 Attempt (See Tentative Draft Part 2.] 
llO Solicitation [See Tentative Draft Part 2.] 
 120 Conspiracy 
125 Duration of Conspiracy for Purposes of Limitations of Actions 
130 Defenses to Solicitation and Conspiracy 
140 Multiple Convictions Barred 
 
Sec. 11. 31. 120. CONSPIRACY. (a) A person commits the crime of conspir 
I 





rson in the first degree, kidnapping in any degree, extortion or a scheme to 
�efraud in the first degree, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in 
�r 
ii 
cause the performance of that conduct and he or one of those persons does 
;�n overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
l (b) If a person commits the crime of conspiracy, as defined in (a) of
 this section, and knows that a person with whom he conspires to commit a 
 jcrime has conspired or will conspire with another person or persons to commit
1
I 
lhe same crime, he is guilty of conspiring with that person or persons,
 hether or not he knows their identities, to commit that crime. 
r
 l (c) In a prosecution under this section it is an affirmative defense
 that the defendant, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete
 
�enunciation of his criminal intent, gave timely warning to law enforcement
uthorities or otherwise made proper effort to prevent the commission of ther
1
brime that was the object of the conspiracy. Renunciation by one conspirator1
I I� o11s not affect the 1 i .thi.lity r)f another cnn•;pirat:or who Joes not join in the 
1 
enunc1.at1.on. . . 
 
(cl) The liability of a conspirator for offense:. committed :i.n fu· theranc 
�
 
)f the conspiracy, including n ci:imr. which i_s the onj(�cl: of the con:;p1.raey, 
 
hall he clet:erminecl by ch. 16 of this title. 1
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(e) Conspiracy is a 
(1) clas� l\ felony if the object of the conspiracy is murder; 
(2) class n felony if the object of the conspiracy is arson in the 
4 ifirst degrPe or kidnapping in any degree; 
J ( 3) class C felony if the object of the conspiracy is extortion or ,, ,, 
0 Ii scheme to defraud in the first degree. 
I' 
7 I 
Sec. 11.30.125. DURZ\'I'ION OF CONSPIRACY FOR PURPOSES OF LIMITATIONS OF 
8 ! ACTIONS. ( a) For purposes of applying the statutes governing limitations of 
9 !actions in a prosecution under sec. 120 of this chapter, conspiracy is a con-
10 i tinuing course of conduct which terminates 




when the crime or crimes which are its object are completed; 
when the agreement is abandoned by the defendant and by the per 
13 ! son or persons with whom he agreed; or 
,� I ( 3) as to an individual defendant, when he abandons the agreement b, 
15 •
1 
advising the person or pEirsons with whom he agreed of his abandonment or he in 
16 forms law enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of hi 
17 lparticipation in it. 
18 1 (bl For purposes of (a) ( 2) of this section, abandonment is rebuttably 
19 j
Presumed if neither the defend�nt nor anyone with whom he conspired does an 
I , 
�0 1overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy during the applicable period of 
21 !limitations. 
22 Sec. 11.31.130. DEPENSES TO SOLICI'I'l\TION AND CONSPIRACY. (a) In a 
23 iprosccution under sec. 110 or 120 of this chapter, it is not a defense 
I 
24 ( 1) that the cl�fendant belonqs to a. class of persons who by cJefin-
25 ition are legally incc1pabl0 in an individual capacity of committing the crime 
26 that is the object of the solicitation or conspiracy; or 
27 ( 2) thut a pen�o11 whom the clcfencl,mt comm.::rnds, solicits or con-
� spi�es with could not be guilty of the crime that is the object of the 
29jsolicitation or conspiracy because of 
4. 












5 ;, It 
6 !1 I• 
7 ll 
I, 
(A) lack of criminal responsibility or other legal incapacity 
or exemption; 
(B) unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in 
question or of the criminal purpose of the defendant; or 
(C) any other factor precluding the culpable mental state 
required for the commission of the crime. 
(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under sec. 110 or 120 of this 
8 /
1





ot be legally accountable under AS 11.16 . 120 (a) (1) or 
the defendant would 
(2) for the conduct of 
10 ;: the person he commanded or solicited or the conduct of 
11 �with whom he conspired. 
the person or persons 
I' 
12 Sec. 11.31. 140. MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS BARRED. (a) It is not a defense 
13 to a prosecution under sec. 100, 110 or 120 of this chapter that the crime 
14 jthat is the object of the attempt, solicitation or conspiracy was actually 
15 !committed pursuant to the attempt, solicitation or conspiracy. 
16 (b) A person may not be convicted of more than one crime defined by 
17 sec, 100, 110 or 120 of this chapter for conduct designed to commit or 




,o , conduct of hoth (1) a crime defined by sec. 100, 110 
A person may not be convicted on the basis of the same course of 
or 120 of this chapter; 
21 and (2) the crime that is the object of the attempt, solicitation or con-
22 spiracy. 
23 (d) This section does not bar inclusion of multiple counts in a sin8le 
24 indictment or informntion charging commission of a crime or crimes defined by 
2'.:> sec. 100, 110 or 120 of this chapter and commission of the crime that is the 







conviction is consistent with (a) , (b), and (c) of this section. 
(e) If a per!_;on con�;pircs to commit more than one crime listed in 
!1 
sec. 120 of thii; c:haptt•r, he comrni ts only one crime of conspiracy so long as 
5. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 31. Attempt and Related Offenses ( Part 2) 
co�1irnNTARY 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF �RVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11. 31. 120. CONSPIRACY 
A. Existing Law 
A general conspiracy statute does not appear in 
existing law. Hith the exception of conspiracies to kidna�, 
AS 11. 15. 270, anc, "Conspiracies a<Jainst :i::-ights of persons", 
AS 11. 60. 340, mere agreements to commit crimes, even if 
accompanied by an overt act toward the cowmission of the 
crime, are not criminal unless the conduct reaches the level 
of attempt or solicitation. 
B. The Code Provision 
The decision to include a limited conspiracy statute 
in the Revised Code was one of the Most debated issues con­
sidered by the SuhcoI11I'lission. The conspiracy statute appear­
ing in the Code is the most narrowly drafted of any state 
conspiracy statute. See generally Note, Conspiracy: Statuto:i::-y 
Reforr1 Since the Model Penal Code, 75 CQLUM. L. REV. 1122 (1975) 
Conspi:i::-acy is limitect to agreements to commit any of five 
crimes - murder (TD AS 11.41. 110), arson in the first degree 
(TD AS 11. 46.400), kirlnapping in any degree (TD AS 11. 41.300-
. 310), extortion (TD AS 11.46. 19 5) and scheme to defraud in 
the first degree (TD AS 11.46. 600) (It is likely that the 
proposed conspiracy statute will be amended after Dec. 10 , 
19 77, to include the existing criPJ.e of "ConsJ?iracies aaainst 
rights of persons. ") 
7. 
In limiting conspiracy to agreer.ents to commit five 
crimes, the Revised Code recognizes both the potential for 
abuse of a general conspiracy statute (see Johnson, The 
Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, (1973)) 
and the need to criminalize agreements to commit crimes involv­
ing serious danger to persons and aggravated economic offenses 
(see MODEL PENAL CODE� 5. 0 3, Commentary at 96-101 (Tent. 
Draft No. 10, 1960). With the exception of scheme to defraud 
in the first degree (discussed in this Tentative Draft), the 
:five crimes listed in the cons?iracy statute have been exam­
ined in Parts 1 - 3 of the Tentative Draft. The reader is 
referred to those provisions for a discussion of the target 
crimes included in the proposed conspiracy statute. 
1. Subsections (a) and (b) - Conspiracy; 
Conspiratorial Relationship 
To commit conspiracy a person must act with an "intent 
to promote or facilitate conduct constituting murder, arson in 
the first degree, kidnapping in any degree, extortion or a scheme 
to defraud in the first degree. " The intent requirement for 
conspiracy is simi_lar to the culpable mental state require­
ment in TD AS 11. 16. 110, liability based on concuct of another: 
complicity. Acting with the requisite intent, the person must 
agree "with one or more persons to engage in or cause the per­
formance" of conduct constituting that crime. In addition to 
the intent and the agreement requirements, proof that one of 
the parties committed an overt act in furtherance of the agree­
ment must be established. Though some recently revised codes 
8. 
have not included the "overt act" requirement (see, e. g. , 
OR. REV. STAT. § 16 1.450 (19 7 3) ;  PROPOSED MICH. REV. CRIM. 
CODE§ 1015 (196 7) ) ,  the Subcornmission concluded that this 
limiting element should be included in the statute. There 
is significant case law interpreting what conduct is suf­
ficient to constitute an "overt act. " See qenerally 
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL L�W 616-18 (2d ed. 1g69). 
The issue of who is included in a conspiracy other 
than the defendant and the person he specifically agreed with 
is addressed in subsection (b) of the draft. Consider the case 
where John agrees with Steve to commit murder and Steve in turn 
hires Peter to commit the crime. In such a circumstance, is 
there a conspiracy among John, Steve ann Peter or only individ­
ual conspiracies - John and Steve, and Steve and Peter? Subsec­
tion (h) provides that a conspiracy exists between all three if 
John knows that Steve will conspire with Peter to coITlP.lit the 
offense. 
The combined effects of subsections (a) and (b) 
are summarized in the Commentary to the 1\1:odel Penal Code 
The Draft relies upon the combined operation 
of [TD AS ll. 31. 120 (a) - (b) ] to delineate the 
identity and scope of a conspiracy. All . . .  pro­
visions focus upon the culpability of the individual 
actor. [TD AS ll. 31. 120 (a) - (b) ] limit the scope of 
his conspiracy (a) in terms of its criminal objects, 
to those crimes which he had the purpose of 
promoting or facilitating and (b) in terms of 
parties, to those with whom he agreed, except where 
the same crime that he conspired to corrm1i t is, to 
his knowledge, also the object of a conspiracy 
between one of his co-conspirators and another 
p\3rson or persons. " 
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 5. 03 Commentary at 119-20 (Tent. Draft No. 10 
1960) . 
9 • 
2. Subsection (c) - Renunciation 
Sw)section (c) provides for the affirmative defense 
of renunciation to conspiracy. The defense parallels the 
defense set forth in TD AS 11. 16.120 (a) (3) (B) which allows for 
renrnnciation by accomplices. The reader is referred to 
Commentary accompanying Tentative Draft, Part 2 at 33- 34 for 
a discussion of the requirements of this defense. 
3. Subsection (d) - Accomplice Liability Based 
on Conspiracy 
Subsection (d) follows the lead of the National 
Commission on Reform of Federal Cri�inal Laws in rejecting the 
doctrine of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 6 40 (1946), 
that mere membership in a conspiracy creates criminal liability 
for all offenses committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, A 
Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, Final Report§ 100 4 (5), 
Comment at 72 (1971). To establish accomplice liability, the 
ordinary rules set forth in chapter 16, parties to a crime, 
must be satisfied. Mere participation in a conspiracy will 
not, in and of itself, be sufficient to establish complicity 
for the substantive offense if the conspiracy is successful. 
II. TD AS 11. 3 1. 125. DURATION OF CONSPIRACY FOR PURPOSES 
OF LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 
This section is derived from OR. REV. STAT. § 161. 
46 5 (1973). The Commentary to the Oregon Revised Criminal 
Code, at 61, discusses the section: 
10. 
This section provides that the conspiracy ter­
minates for purposes of the statute of limitations 
as to all parties to the cons?iracy when the object 
of the conspiracy, the crime, has been abandoned by 
all as evidenced by a lack of any overt act during 
the time limitation period. The conspiracy terminates 
for the purpose of time limitation for the individual 
conspirator if he expresses his wish to abandon either 
to his co-conspirators or if he tells the police of 
the existence of the conspiracy and his intention to 
abandon it. Note here that this does not necessarily 
constitute a renunciation as provided in !TD AS 11. 
31.120 (c) ] ,  supra. Abandonment starts the limitation 
statute running but is not otherwise a defense to a 
charge of conspiracy. . Subsection . . [ (a) (2)] 
of the draft, relating to abandonment by all the con­
spirators, represents the generally accepted view, 
according to the comments to the Model Penal Code sec­
tion. Hith respect to subsection [ (a) (3)] , abandon­
ment by the individual conspirator, the cases are 
fewer and the law less well settled. The major problem 
turns on what the individual is required to do before 
he can show he has abandoned. The choice of the Model 
Penal Code, as reflected in the draft section, seems 
reasonable. By requiring him to inform his co­
conspirators of his intention to abandon the scheme, 
the policy goal is served whereby the co-conspirators 
may be discouraged and dissuaded by the announced 
defection. If the individual chooses instead to tell 
the police of his desire to abandon, it is obviously 
more likely that the conspiracy will be smashed before 
its criminal goal can be achieved. 
Note that under subsection (b) , abandonment 
of the conspiracy by all parties is rebuttably presumed 
if no party COinr'.lits an overt act within the statutory 
time period following the initial agreement. This pre­
sumption may be overcome and continued vitality of the 
agreement shown by conduct not rising to the level of 
an overt act, i. e. , constant and continued reference to 
the agreement by a participant. 
11. 
III. T8 AS 11. 31. 1 30. DEFENSES TO SOLICITATION AND CONSPIRACY 
The statute specifically precludes two defenses to 
conspiracy and solicitation and recognizes one defense to those 
crimes. 
1. Subsection (a) (1) 
This subsection is the counterpart of TD AS 11. 16 
.120 (b) (2), Exemptions to cri�inal liability for conduct of 
another (discussed in Tentative Draft, Part 2 at 35). Like 
that provision, it is based on the generally accepted principle 
that a person who is not capable in his individual capacity of 
committing a crime may nevertheless he liable for conduct of 
another that constitutes an offense. 
2. Subsection ( a) ( 2) 
This subsection parallels TD AS ll. 16.120 (b) (3) 
(discussed in Tentative Dratt, Part 2 at 35). The following 
commentary, taken from the Proposed Michiqan Revised Criminal 
Code, examines the effect of this suhsection, 
The provision is based on the universally 
acknowledged principle that one is no less guilty 
of a crime because he uses or attempts to use the 
overt behavior of an innocent or irresponsible agent. 
The only special problem presented here concerns the 
situation in which there are two parties to the 
agreement and one is immune from criminal responsi­
bility for any of the reasons listed in the subsection. 
Although there are no Michigan decisions on point, 
decisions in other jurisdictions have held that there 
can be no conspiracy in such situations because a 
conspiracy, as an agreement of two or more persons, 
requires at least two guilty conspirators (citations 
omitted). It is suggested that the danger of the 
12. 
conspiracy arising from the prospective joint action 
remains essentially the same whether or not one of 
the conspirators is immune from prosecution. Moreover, 
the major basis for imposing liability in the area 
of inchoate crimes, the unequivocal evidence of a 
firm purpose to commit a crime, is present irrespective 
of the co-conspirator's innocence or immunity. 
PP.GPOSED MICII. P.FV. CR:!:'L conF. § l[)l 5, CoJTII'1entary r:1+: l O 7 
(Final Draft, 196 7) . 
3. Subsection (b) 
This provision is a counterpart to TD AS 11. 16 
. 120(a) (discussed in Tentative Draft, Part 2 at 32). 'l'he 
subsection is designed to insure that a person who would 
not be criminally liable as an accomplice if a crime was 
completed will not be liable for solicitation or con­
spiracy when the crime is not completed. 
TD AS ll. 16. 120(a) (1) provides that a victim of a 
crime, e. g. , the fifteen-year-old in statutory rape, is not 
liable as an accomplice to the crime even if  he or she 
solicited the commission of the crime. Similarly, TD AS 
ll. 31. 130 (b) provides that the fifteen-year-old is not 
liable for solicitation or conspiracy if the substantive 
offense is not completed. 
TD AS 11. 16 . 120 (a) (2) provides that a person is 
not liable as an accomplice if his behavior is "inevitably 
incidental" to the commission of the offense unless a statute 
specifically imposes liability. If the potential accomplice 
is not liable for the commission of a completed offense, 
TD AS ll. 31. 130(b) provides that there is also no liability 
for solicitation or conspiracy. 
13. 
IV. TD AS 11. 31. 140. MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS BARRED 
Subsection (a) is designed to permit prosecution 
for attempt, solicitation or conspiracy even if the target 
crime was completed. Although prosecution is allowed for 
both the preparatory as well as the completed crime, subsection 
(c) prohibits convictions of both crimes. As used in this 
statute "conviction" refers to the imposition of multiple 
sentences for the listed offenses, not the jury's return of 
multiple guilty verdicts. 
Subsection (b) precludes conviction of more than one 
preparatory crime for conduct designed to culminate in commis­
sion of the same target crime. The subsection reflects the 
policy of finding the evil of preparatory action in the danger 
that it may culminate in the substantive offense that is its 
object; there is no reason to cumulate convictions of attempt, 
solicitation and conspiracy to commit the same crime. 
Subsection (d) is included to emphasize that sub­
sections (b) and (c) deal only with convictions and not with 
prosecutions. Prosecution may be for one or more preparatory 
crimes as well as for the completed crime. 
Subsection (e) is discussed in the commentary to 
the Proposed 'hssouri Criminal Code. 
Subsection . [e] states the normal rules where 
there is more than one criminal objective. If there is 
only one agreement there is only one conspiracy. If 
various offenses are the product of a contiuous rela­
tionship they should be considered part of one conspiracy. 
Otherwise multiplication of sentences might become 
almost fortuitous and, considering the extremely inchoate 
nature of conspiracy, oppressive and unjust. 
PROPOSED MO. CRIM. CODE § 9 .  0 20 ( e) , Cormr1entary at 121 (19 7 3) . 
14. 
V. TD AS 11. 31. 150. PENALTY 
Punishment for conspiracy is set one class lower 
than the target crime. This classification system is consistent 
with the Code's classification of attempt and solicitation. 
15. 
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L A- L 2 0 A 
400 - 450 Sec Tentative Draft, Part 3 
480 Criminal Mis chief in the First  Degree 
482 Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree 
484 Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree 
486 Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree 
490 Definitions 
Sec. 1 1 .  4 6 .  Lf80 . CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of cr iminal mis chief in the first degree if , 
having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to b e lieve he has 
such a right , 
(1)  and with intent to cause ci substantial intc·rruption or 
impairment of a service rendered to the public by a utility or by an 
organization which deals with emergencies involving danger to life or 
property , he damages or tampers with property of that utility or organi-
zation and causes substantial interruption or impa irment of service to 
the puhlic ; 
(2) and with intent to damage property of another by the 
use of widely danr,erous means, he damages property of another in an 
amo�nt exceeding $100, 000 by the use of widely dangerous means; or 
(3) he intentionally damages an oil or gas pipeline or 
supporting facility. 
(b) Cri mina l mischief in the first degree is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11.  46. l�82 . CRIMINAL MJ.SClllEF IN THE SECOND DEGREE . (a)  A 
person conmd. t r. the crime of criminnl mischief in the second degree i f, 
having no rir,ht to do so or any reasonable ground to bel ieve he has 
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( 1 )  and with intent to damagL'. property of anot her , h e  damages 
property of another in an amount of $500 or more ; 
( 2 )  he tampers with an oil or gas pipeline or suppor t ing 
facility with reckless disregard for the risk of harm to or loss of the 
property ; or 
(3) he recklessly creates a risk of damage in an amount 
exceeding $100 , 000 to property of anothc·r by the use of widely dangerous 
means . 
(b)  Criminal mischief in the second degree is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. 46. 484 . CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IN THE THIRD DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of criminal rnii: chief in the third degree if, 
with intent to damage proper ty of another, and having no right to do so 
or any reasonable ground to believe he has such a right , he damages 
property of another in an amount of $50 or more but less than $500. 
(b) Criminal mischief in the thinl degree is a class A misde­
meanor. 
Sec. 11. L,6. 48 6 .  CRIMINAL MISCHIEF lN THE FOUH.TH DEGREE . (a )  A 
person commits the crime of criminal mischief in the fourth degree if , 
having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he 
has such a right , 
( 1 )  and with reckless disregard for the risk of harm t o  or  
loss of  the property or with intent to  cause substantial inconvenience 
to anoth�r , he tampers with property of another ; 
(2) he recklessly damages property of another in an amount 
of $500 or more ; or 
(3)  he in tentionally damages property of another. 
(b) Criminal mischief in the fourth degree i� a cla s s  B misde-
meaner. 
Sec. 11. 46 , /1 90. DEFIN ITION S. As used in secs. L,00 - 490 of this 
17 . 









1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 






2 7  
28 
29 
L A- L 2 0A 
chap ter , un l e s s  the context requires otherwise , 
. (1)  " oil  or gas pipel ine or supporLing fac i l ities" means real  
and- umgih le property used  in t · Jw cxp lor, 1t ion for , product ion or ref in­
ing o f ,  or pipe l ine transpor t a t ion of o i l  or gas , except  for prop erty 
used solely in the retail  d i s tribution of o i l  or ga s ;  
( 2 )  " tamper" means to in t erfere with sometb ing improperly , 
meddle with i t , or make unwarran t e d  alterations in i t s  exi s t ing condi­
tion;  
(3)  "ut i l i ty" means an enterp1· ise , whether publ icly  or 
priva tely owned or operated , which provides  gas , e l e c tr ic , s team, water , 
sewer , or communications s ervice , and ;:ny common ca rrier ; 
(4) "widely dangerous mean s "  means any d i f f icul t - to - confine 
sub s t ance , force , or other means capab l e  of caus ing widespread damage , 
including bu t not l imited Lo fire , explosion ,  avalanche , poison , radio­
ac t ive material , b a c teria , collapse  o f  a buildin g ,  or floo d .  
18 . 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 46 - Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 3. ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES (Part 2) 
COMMENTARY 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11.46.480- 486. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 
A. Existing Law 
The primary statute covering damage to property 
other than by arson is AS 11. 20. 515, "Malicious mischief and 
destruction of property. " A person who "wilfully or maliciously 
destroys, defaces, injures or exposes to injury real or personal 
property not his own" commits the crime of malicious destruction 
of property and is punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years 
and/or a $ 1000 fine if the damage exceeds $250 . If the 
damage does not exceed $ 250 , the penalty is set at imprisonment 
for up to 1 year and/or a $1000 fine. The person "who wilfully 
interferes with or tampers with property not his own, with the 
purpose to harm the property. or with reckless disregard 
for the risk of harm" commits the crime of malicious mischief 
and is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of 1 year and/ 
or a $ 100 - $ 5000 fine. Note that the maximum fine is five 
times greater when property is mer8ly tampered with than when 
it is actually damaged. 
Separate provisions cover damage or interference 
with any part of an aircraft, AS 11.20.525 (maximum 10 years 
imprisonment and/or $ 10, 000 fine) ; malicious destruction of 
property by a tenant, AS 11.20.575 (maximum 1 year imprisonment 
19. 
and/or $500 fine) ; misuse, damage or destruction of a camp, 
AS 11. 20 . 670-. 690 (maximum three month imprisonment and/or 
$ 500 fine) ; damage or destruction of highway, AS ll. 20. 590 (a) 
(maximum l year imprisonment and/or $ 50 0. fine); dar:1age or 
destruction of a traffic control signal or sign , AS ll . 20.590 (c) 
(maximum l year imprisonment and/or $ 500 fine) ; destruction 
of any part of cemetery, AS 11. 40. 460 (1 - 30 day imprisonment 
and $5 - $ 500 fine) ; malicious destruction of oil or gas pipe­
line or supporting facility, AS ll. 20 . 517 (a) (10 year maximum 
and/or $ 2 5, 000 fine) ; tampering with oil or gas pipeline or 
supporting facility, AS ll. 20. 517 (b) (3 year maximum and/or 
$5000 fine) ; destruction of sign upon posted oil or gas 
property, AS ll. 20. 517 (c) ( 1  year maximum and/or $ 5000) ; 
tampering with posted notices, AS 11. 65. 0 30 (1  - 6 month im­
prisonment or $50 - $ 300 fine). 
Numerous statutes outside Title 1 1  also cover 
criminal damage to property. See, e. g. ,  AS 42. 20.0 30 (inj ury 
to or interference with telegraph, telephone, electric or 
gas lines); AS 38. 05. 360 (waste or injury to state land); 
AS 35. 10. 140 (damage or destruction of public works); 
AS 0 2 . 30. 0 20 (tampering with aircraft). 
B. The Code Provisions 
The needless proliferation of overlapping statutes 
which carry inconsistent penalty provisions covering damage to 
or tampering with property is eliminated in the Revised Code 
by the creation of the four-tiered crime of criminal mischief. 
20. 
Division of the crime into four degrees is based on four 
factors : the culpable mental state of the defendant; the 
amount of damage, if any, caused or risked ;  the type of 
property damaged or tampered with; and the means used to 
cause the damage. Common to each degree of criminal mischief 
is the requirement that the defendant have no right nor any 
reasonable ground to believe he has a right to interfere 
with the property. 
1. TD AS 11. 46. 480. Criminal Mischief in the First 
Degree 
The most aggravated form of criminal mischief , a 
class B felony, can be committed in any of three ways. Sub­
section (a) (1) applies to the intentional causing of a 
"substantial interruption or impairment of a service rendered 
to the public by a utility [defined in TD AS ll.46. 4 90 (a) (3)] 
or by an organization which deals with emergencies involving 
danger to life or property. " Thus, the destruction of a 
power line that serves the public or the placing of sugar 
in the gas tanks of an ambulance fleet, if done with the 
requisite intent, will be a violation of the first degree 
statute if substantial interruption or impairment of the 
service results. 
Subsection { a) (2) covers conduct that in some revised 
codes is designated as the somewhat exotic crime of "causing a catas­
trophe. " See, �.:_5I - ,  MO. REV. STAT. § 569. 070 (effective ,Jan 1, 1979) 
The definition of "widely dangerous means" (TD AS 11. 46. 4 9 0  (a) (4)) 
2 1 .  
insures that the proposed statute is only applicable when a 
person employs a difficult to confine force such as an ava­
lanche, radioactive material, or flood to cause substantial 
property damage. The likelihood of serious physical injury 
resulting from the use of a "widely dangerous means" to cause 
damage to property justifies classification of this conduct 
as more serious than other forms of property damage other than 
by arson. While the defendant must intend to use "widely 
dangerous means" to damage property of another, he need not 
intend that the resulting damage exceed $ 100 , 000 - strict 
liability is imposed as to that element. 
Subsection (3) parallels the coverage of existing 
AS ll. 20 . 517 (a) , enacted during the 19 7 7  legislative session. 
2. TD AS 1 1 .  4 6 . 4 8 2 . Criminal Mischief in the Second 
Degree 
Criminal mischief in the second degree, a class C 
felony , may also be committed in three ways. The first, 
described in subsection (a) (1) ,  occurs when a person inten­
tionally damages property of another and causes damage in an 
amount of $ 500 or more. Again, strict liability is imposed as 
to the amount of damage. 
Subsection ( a) ( 2) parallels the coverage of existing 
AS ll. 20. 517 (b) which, like AS ll.20. 517 (a) , was enacted during 
the 19 77 legislative session. The coverage of the section is 
an aggravated forn of criminal mischief in the fourth degree , 
TD AS 11. 46. 486 (a) ( 1 ) , discussed infra. 
Subsection (a) (3) prohibits conduct similar to that 
2 2. 
described in subsection (a) (2) of the first degree statute. 
The second degree offense, however, does not require that the 
defendant actually damage property of another; reckless 
creation of a risk of damage in excess of $100, 000 to property 
of another by the use of a widely dangerous means is made 
punishable by subsection (a) (3). The culpable mental state 
of "recklessly ", defined in TD AS ll. ll. 140 (a) (3) (Tentative 
Draft, Part 2 at 5) , requires that the person be " aware of 
and consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that " the damage will occur. Neither ordinary negligence nor 
criminally negligent behavior are sufficient to constitute 
a violation of the statute. 
3 .  TD AS 11. 46. 48 4. Criminal Mischief in the Third 
Degree 
Criminal mischief in the third degree, a class A 
misdemeanor , is similar to subsection (a) (1) of the second 
degree offense. To be guilty of the third degree offense, 
howeve r, the damage need only exceed $ 50. The second degree 
offense requires at least $ 500 damage. 
4 .  TD AS 1 1. 46. 486. Criminal Mischief in the Fourth 
Degree 
Criminal mischief in the fourth degree, a class B 
misdemeanor, covers the person who merely " tampers " ( df' f.-i.ne d 
in TD AS 11. 46. 49 0 (2) ) with property. The defendant must act 
with either a reckless disregard for the risk of harm to the prop­
erty or an intent to cause substantial inconvenience to another. 
Subsection (a) (2) provides that the fourth degree 
2 3. 
offense also occurs when a person recklessly damages property 
of another in an amount $ 500 or more . The minimum dollar 
figure of $ 500 is intended to insure that relatively innocuous 
behavior that causes minor property damage will not be sub­
ject to criminal penalties (e. g . ,  softball goes through 
window during baseball game) . 
Subsection (a) ( 3) provides that the intentional 
damaging of property of another, regardless of the amount of 
damage, is criminal mis chief in the fourth degree. The 
statute is broad enough to cover such acts as the destruction 
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CHAPTER 1+6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY. 
ARTICLE 5. l.lUSlNESS AND COMMERCIAL OFFENSES. 
Section 
600 Scheme tu Defraud in the First Degree 
610 Scheme to Defraud in the Second Degree 
620 Misapplication of Property 
630 Falsifying Business Records 
660 Commercial Bribe Receiving 
670 Commercial Bribery 
680 Eniaging in a Business Unlawfully 
685 Criminal Usury in the First Degree 
690 Criminal Usury in the Second Degree 
700 Possession of Usurious Loan Records 
 710 - 850 [Reserved] 
Sec. 11.46.600. SCHEME TO DEFRAUD IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A person
ommits the crime of scheme to defraud in the first degree when he 
 (1) engages in conduct constituting a scheme to defraud ten or
 ore persons, or a scheme to obtain property from ten or more persons by 
 alse or fraudulent pretense,. representation or promise; and 
 (2) obtains property from one or more of those persons. 
 (b) Scheme to defraud in the first degree is a class B felony. 
 Sec. 11.46.610. SCHEME TO DEFRAUD IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person 
 ommi ts the crime of scheme to defraud in the second degree when he 
 (1) engages in conduct constituting a scheme to defraud two or
 10re persons, or a scheme to obtain property from two or more persons by 
 alse or fraudulent pn,tcn�:e_ , representation or promise; and 
 (2) obtains property from one or more of those persons. 
 (b) Scheme to dcfr:,ucl in the second degree is a clat�s A misdemeanor.
 Sec. 11.. Lf6. 620. MlSAl'l'I.ICATION OF PROPERTY. (a) A pl!rson commits the
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crime of misapplication of property if he knowingly misapplies 11roperty that 
2 has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary or that is property of the govern-
3 ment or a financial institution. 
4 (b) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that it may
s be impossible to identify particular property as belonging to the victim at 










(c) For purposes of this section, 
(1) "governmental regulation" includes administrativr� regulations
and judicial rules and orders as well as statutes and ordinances; 
(2) "misapply" means to deal with or dispose of property contrary
to law or contrary to the terms of the fiduciary relationship or govern­
mental regulation relating to the custody or disposition of that pro­
perty. 
(d) Misapplication of property is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.46.630. FALSIFYING BUSINESS RECORDS. (a) A person commits the 
16 crime of falsifying business records when, with intent to defraud, he 
17 (1) makes or causes a false entry in the business records of an
18 enterprise; 
19 (2) alters, erases, obliterates, deletes, removes or destroys a
� true entry in the business records of an enterprise; 
21 (3) omits to make a true entry in the business records of an
22 enterprise in violation of a duty to do so which he knows to be imposed upon 
23 him by law or by the nature of his position; or 
24 (4) prevents the making of a true entry or causes th� omission of






(b) For purposes of this section,
(1) "business record" means a writing or article kept or main­
tained by an enterprise for the purpose of evidencing or reflecting its 
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(2) "enterprise" means a private entity of one or more persons, 
corporate or otherwise, engaged in business, commercial, professional, 
charitable, political, industrial or social activity. 
(c) Falsifying business records is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 46.660. COMMERCIAL BRIBE RECEIVING. (a) A person commits the 
6 crime of commercial bribe receiving if he 
7 (1) solicits a benefit with the intent to violate a duty to which 










(A) agent or employee of another; 
(B) trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary; 
(C) lawyer, physician, accountant, appraiser, or other 
professional adviser; 
(D) officer, director, partner, manager or other participant 
in the direction of the affairs of an organization; or 
(E) arbitrator or other purportedly disinterested adjudicator 
or referee; or 
(2) accepts or agrees to accept a benefit upon an agreement or 
IS understanding that he will violate a duty to which he is subject as described 











(b) Commercial bribe receiving is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.46.670. COMMERCIAL BRIBERY. (a) A person commits the crime of 
ommercial bribery if he confers, offers to confer or agrees to confer a 
enefit upon a person with intent to influence that person to violate a duty 
o which he is subject as described in sec. 660(a) (l) of this chapter. 
(b) ColTllllercial bribery is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.46.680. ENGAGING IN A BUSINESS UNLAWFULLY. (a) A person 
ommits the offense of cngar.,inf, in a business unlawfully if 
(1) he eng.1ees in or prnctices a business, professio11 or occu-
mt ion for which a license, certificate or permit is required by law without 
27. 
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l1aving first obtained the required license, certificate or permit or after 
2 his licen:;e, certificate or permit has been formally suspended, revoked or 


























(2) a penalty is not otherwise provided by law or lawfully adopte 
regulation. 
(b) This offense is one of strict liability. 
(c) Engaging in a business unlawfully is a violation for the first 
offense. Engaging in a business unlawfully is a class B misdemeanor for the 
second and each subsequent offense. 
Sec. 11.46.685. CRIMINAL USURY IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of criminal usury in the first degree when, not being auth 
orized or permitted by law to do so, he knowingly charges, takes or receives 
money or other property as interest on a loan or forbearance of money or 
other property at a rate exceeding 25 per cent per annum, or the equivalent 
rate for a longer or shorter period, as part of a scheme or business of 
making or collecting usurious loans. 
(b) Criminal usury in the first degree is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. 46. 690. CRIMINAL USURY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the offense of criminal usury i.n the second degree when, not being 
authorized or permitted by law to do so, he knowingly charges, takes or 
receives money or other property as interest on a loan or forbearance of 
money or other property at a rate exceeding 25 per cent per annum, or the 
equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period. 
(b) Criminal usury in the second deBree is a violation. 
Sec. 11. Lf6. 700. POSSESSION OF USURIOUS LOAN RECORDS. (a) A person 
commits the crime of possession of usurious loan records when, with knowledg 
that the interest rates charged exceed 25 per cent per annum, or the equiv­
alent rnte for a longer or shorter period, he possesses a writing, paper, 
ins trunicnt or ::.-rticle use<l to record criminal] y usurious transactions 
28. 

































by sec. 685 of this chapter. 
Possession of usurious loan records is a class A misdemeanor . 
29. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 46 - Offenses Against Property 
ARTICLE 5. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11. 46. 600-. 610. SCHEME TO DEFRAUD IN THE FIRST 
AND SECOND DEGREE 
The two degrees of scheme to defraud included in 
the Revised Code are new to existing law. The first degree 
provision will allow for felony prosecution of frauds involv­
ing ten or more victims. The second degree provision pro­
vides misdemeanor penalties when between two and ten victims 
are involved. It is not an element of either crime that a 
specific dollar loss was suffered by the victims. Both 
degrees of scheme to defraud, however, require that the defend­
and obtain some property from at least one of his victims. 
The need for such statutes is highlighted when 
it is considered that the most serious degree of theft in the 
Revised Code, theft in the first degree, is only a class C 
felony. As an element of that crime the state must estab­
lish that at least $500 was obtained, that the property was 
taken fron the person of the victim, or that the property 
was a firearm. Thus, if, pursuant to a single scheme to 
defraud 100 persons a defendant obtains $20 from each of 20 
persons he has only comrnitted theft in the second degree, 
TD AS 11.46.140, a class A nisdemeanor. 
30. 
The Code sections provide that in instances where 
two or more persons are the victims or potential victims of 
a scheme to defraud the aggravating factor is the number of 
victims involved and not the amount of loss. Further, in 
classifying scheme to defraud in the first degree as a class 
B felony, the Revised Code provides that the most serious 
theft related offense is one which involves numerous victims, 
regardless of the amount of property that is taken. 
The two degrees of scheme to defraud are patterned 
after 18 U.S. C. § 1341 (1970) and the revised version of that 
statute appearing in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code 
S. 1437, 95th Cong. , 1st Sess. § 1734 (1977). The federal 
statute is commonly referred to as the mail fraud statute. 
The legislative history of the mail fraud 
statute is sparse. Although Congress has amended 
the statute five times since its enactment in 1872, 
these amendments involved only inconsequential 
changes in wording. Thus the basic elements of 
the statute have remained unchanged. Due to the 
absence of any evidence of legislative intent, 
the law of mail fraud has been largely judge-made. 
Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 2 U. Tll. L. F. 237, 239 
(1975) [footnotes omitted]. 
The federal statute provides in pertinent part: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise 
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises. . [and 
us es the rnails] shall be imprisoned not more than 
five years. 
18 u.s.c. § 1341 (1970). 
Only one degree of mail fraud exists in federal 
law. N. Y. PENAL LA�'-1 §§ 190.60-.65 (.t1cI<inney Supp. 1976), 31. 
derived directly from the mail fraud statute, <listinguish 
between two degrees of schemes to defraud depending on how 
many victims are involved in the scheme. The degree struc­
ture of the New York statutes is adopted in the Revised Code. 
Initially, it should be noted that the federal pro­
vision is not limited to fraudulent schemes to obtain property. 
For example, the mail fraud statute has been interpreted to 
cover political corruption involving breaches of fiduciary 
duty and vote fraud. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F. 2d 1124 
(7th Cir. ), cert. denied, 417 U. S. 976 (1974); United States 
v. States, 488 F. 2d 761 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 
U. S. 909 (1974). On the other hand, the New York statutes 
and the two degrees of scheme to defraud in the Revised Code 
require that property be obtained. 
The requirement that property be obtained as part 
of the crime indicates that like the antitrust 
laws, the statutes are directed toward economic 
crimes. They would therefore not apply, for 
example, to political activity or data used as 
part of public advocacy of a particular position. 
N. Y.  PENAL LAW § 190. 60, Comment at 31 (McKinney Supp. 1976). 
A substantial body of federal case law has developed 
around the mail fraud statute making it an effective tool in 
the area of consumer fraud. Because the language of the 
proposed statutes parallels that of the mail fraud statute it 
is expected that the judicial decisions under the federal pro­
vision will be highly relevant to the construction of TD AS 
11.46. 600-. 610. As noted in Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong. , 2d Sess. , Report to Accompany S. l, Criminal Justice 
32. 
Reform Act of 1975, 699 (Comm. Print 1976), the cases prose­
cuted under the mail fraud statute have in part established 
the following principles: 
A. The phrase "scheme and artifice to defraud" 
is to be broadly interpreted; for example, it �as been 
held to reach a scheme calculated to deceive persons 
of ordinary prudence and comprehension even though no 
misrepresentation is made. 
B. Any scheme which involves elements of trickery 
or deceit is within the mail fraud statute. 
C. A scheme to defraud may be shown by statements 
oE half truths or the concealment of material fact, as 
well as by affirmative misrepresentation. 
D. One who acts with reckless indifference as to 
whether a representation is true or false is as liabl e 
as if he had actual knowledge of the falsity. 
E. The success or failure of the scheme is 
immaterial, and it is not necessary to show that any 
person was in fact defrauded. 
F. A scheme to defraud encompasses false repre­
sentations as to future intentions, as well as existing 
facts. 
G. A promoter's sincere belief in the ultimate 
success of his enterprise will not excuse false repre­
sentations. 
H. The mail fraud statute was intended to protect 
the gul lible, the ignorant and the over-credulous as 
well as the more skeptical. The "monumental credulity 
o!: the victim is no shield for the accused." 
I. Proof of reliance on the false representation 
1� not necessary. 
The commentary that follows accompanies New York's �.f 
the scheme to defraud statutes. It provides an excellent dis-
cussion of the coverage of the Code's proposed statutes in 
the area of consumer frauds. 
Like the mail fraud statute, [TD AS 11. 41. 600 and 
. 610) make the nefarious character of ·the scheme rather 
than dollar loss to particular victims the essence of 
the crime. This serves to focus the attention of the 
court and jury on the evil nature of the defendant's 
conduct rather than the extent of pecuniary injury. 
11 also clearly permits prosecution where intentional 
dC'ception is established but where it is impossible 
bi determine the dollar value·of loss to the victims .... 
33. 
[TD AS 11. 41. 600 and .610] require that at least 
one intended victim part with property as a result of 
the scheme, but state that it is not necessary for 
t he prosecution to prove the identity of other intended 
victims. The purpose of this provision is to require 
conduct to be engaged in looking t o  execution of the 
scheme, so that it is not a crime which one can commit 
within one's mind without actual conduct. At the same 
time the provision by not requiring proof of identity 
of more than one victim, prevents defendants from de­
feating justice by bringing pressure to bear on witness­
victims named in the indictment. Such pressures could 
be brought through offering refunds to particular vic­
tims or threatening harsh collection tactics if they 
testified adversely to the defendant. 
The scheme t o  defraud statutes also avoid the prob­
lem under larceny provisions of adding up the amounts of 
individual theft to permit felony treatment as grand 
larceny . . . . Instead, felony treatment under [TD AS 
11. 41.600], defining a scheme to defraud in t he first 
degree, is based upon the fact that the scheme is one 
to defraud ten or more persons, rather than merely more 
than one person as under scheme to defraud in the second 
degree [TD AS 11. 41. 510]. The felony grade involved is 
Class [B] . .  
N. Y. PENAL LAW § §  190. 60, . 65, Commentary at 29-30 {McKinney 
S upp. 1976). 
II. TD AS 11. 46. 620. MIS APPLICATION OF PROPERTY 
A. Existing Law 
Currently, at least four statutes in Title 11 cover 
conduct involving misapplication of property by fiduciaries 
and government employees. AS 11. 20.330, "Embezzlement by a 
trustee, " applies to a trustee who, "with intent to defraud, 
converts the property or any portion to his own use or benefit, 
or to the use and benefit of another not entitled to it. " If 
the property converted exceeds $100, punishment is from one 
to ten years, otherwise punishment is from one month to one 
year or $ 25-$100 fine. AS 11. 20. 290, "Embezzlement by a bailee, ·, 
34. 
appl ies to a bailee who " wrongfull y  converts to his own use, 
or who fails, neglects, or refuses to deliver, keep, or 
account for, according to the nature of his trust, money or 
property of another. " Punishment is identical to that provided 
for violation of AS 11.20. 330. "Embezzlement by a fiduciary, " 
AS 11. 20. 340, covers conduct similar to AS 11. 20. 3 30 but 
only applies to the acts of a "banker, broker, merchant, 
attorney or agent. " Punishment is also identical to that 
provided for a violation of AS 11.20. 330. 
Embezzlement of public money is prohibited by 
AS 11. 20. 300. No intent to defraud is required. The crime 
is committed when a person having in his possession money 
bel onging to the government "converts [the money] or any 
portion to �is own use or loans it or any portion, or 
neglects or refuses to pay it or any portion over as required 
by l aw." Punishment is set at one to fifteen years imprisonment 
and a fine equal to twice the amount of money involved. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code provision applies to two classes of persons: 
( 1) those who hold property as a " fiduciary, 11 a term to be 
defined in the general definition section of the Code as a 
" trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, receiver or any 
other person carrying on functions of trust on behalf of 
another person or organization, " and (2) those who have access 
to property belonging to the government or a financial ins ti-
tution. "Government" and "financial institution" are defined 
35. 
in TD AS 11. 46. 990 (4), (5). See Tentative Draft, Part 3, at 98 . 
The culpability element requires knowledge that the actor is 
misapplying property, i. e. , acting contrary to legal rules govern-
ing the care of the property in question. The potential defense 
that it may be impossible to identify the particular property 
involved due to commingling, discussed in Tentative Draft, 
Part 3, at 42, is specifically eliminated in subsection {b). 
Note that while similar provisions in a number of 
other revised codes require that the misapplication involve 
a "substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the 
property" {see, e. g. , HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-874 (Special 
Pamph.let 1975)), this element does not appear in the proJ?osed 
statute. The Subcommission concluded that any knowing mis­
application by one of the persons covered by the statute is 
sufficient to justify the imposition of criminal penalties. 
Misapplication of property is classified as a 
class A misdemeanor. This sanction shoul d be sufficient to 
deter persons f rom wrongfully dealing with property when 
they have no intent to deprive the rightful owner of it. If 
such an intent can be established, the defendant may be 
prosecuted for theft. 
III. TD AS 11. 46. 630. FALSIFYING BUSHJESS RECORDS 
A. Existing Law 
Falsifying or destroying corporate or company 
records is currentl y  prohibited by AS 11.20.430. Punishment 
is set at imprisonment for three months to one year, or a 
36. 
fine of $50 to $1000. The defendant must be or assume to be 
an "officer, agent or member of a private corporation or 
company who, with intent to defraud or deceive, wilfully and 
knowingly destroys, alters, mutilates, or in any manner 
falsifies . books, papers, writings, or securities 
belonging to or in the possession of the corporation or 
company. " 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code substantially restates existing 
law and follows the modern trend in maintaining falsifica­
tion of business records as a distinct substantive offense. 
As noted in the Model Penal Code Commentary, 
[i]n a highly organized society like ours where 
accuracy of corporate and other records is nearly 
as important as accuracy of public records, the 
need for deterring tampering with such records 
seems reasonably clear, and there is no occasion 
to distinguish in this regard between corporate 
records and those of a church, union or club. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.7, Comment at 98, (Tent. Draft No. 11 
1960) 
As in existing law, the offense of falsifying business 
records is directed at conduct preliminary to the commission of 
fraud. As an element of the offense the state must establish 
that the defendant acted with an "intent to defraud. " Acting 
with that intent the defendant must make a false entry in, or 
omit, remove or prevent the making of a true entry in the 
busin�ss records of RD enterprise. The offense is also committed 
when the defendant causes the omission of a true entry or causes 
the making of a false entry in business records. 
37. 
IV. TD AS 11. 46. 660-. 670. COMMERCIAL BRIBE RECEIVING; 
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 
Though the crimes of commercial bribe receiving ancl 
commercial bribery are new to existing law, similar provisions 
appear in a significant number of recently revised codes. 
See, e. g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-880 (Special Pamphlet 1975); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.38, § 29 A-1, A-3 (Smith-Hurd); N.Y. 
PENAL LA�v §§ 180.00-. 08 (McKinney Supp. 1976). 
'fhrough the last century, most states attempted 
to regulate the behavior of unscrupulous public 
officials through laws that defined bribery and ex­
tortion of public officials as a criminal offense. 
In the last few years, however, states have begun to 
recognize that bribery in the private sector can also 
be a major threat -- one that can undermine a com­
petitive economic system. As a result, some thirty 
states have moved to specifically prohibit commercial 
bribery. 
The dangers of ignoring commercial bribery are 
quite clear. Gifts of endless variety are traded to 
influence an employee to improperly carry out a respon­
sibility entrusted to him by an individual or corpora­
tion. But when briberv successfully gives a firm an 
unfair advantage over competitors, other husinesses 
may be forced to do the same in order to survive. 
The States Combat W'hite Collar Crime, National Conference of 
State Legislatures (1976) at 10. 
Commercial bribe receiving, TD AS 11. 46.660, a 
class A misdemeanor, covers coIDmercial bribe solicitors or 
receivers. The crime occurs when a person solicits a benefit 
with intent to violate a duty to which he is subject as one 
of the five general classes of persons described in subsec­
tions (a) (1) (A)-{E), or when he accepts or agrees to accept 
a benefit with the intent to violate a duty, or upon an 
38. 
agreement or understanding that he will violate a duty, 
to which he is subject as one of those persons. 
The five general classes are defined broadly to 
cover all areas where a duty of fidelity is owed. 
The nature and scope of such duties are defined by 
common and statutory law regulating or creating the 
various legal relationships involved. Thus, for 
exampl e, the duty of an employee to an employer may 
be not to give away trade secrets, whereas the duty 
of a fiduciary to his beneficiary or a union repre­
sentative of an employee's welfare fund to employees 
may be to exercise independent judgment. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-880, Commentary at 227 (Special Pamphlet 
1975). 
Commercial bribery, TD AS 11.46.670, a class A mis­
demeanor aimed at the person who offers or gives a bribe, 
parallels the Code's general bribery statute, TD AS 11.56.100 
{_discussed in Tentative Draft, Part 2, CoJTlffientary at 93-94). 
v. TD AS 11. 4 6 . 6 8 0 . ENGAGING IN A BUSINESS UNLAWFULLY 
A.  Existing Law 
Currentl y license requirements for various businesses 
and professions are regulated in statutes outside Title 11. 
Practice without a license is punished in a variety of ways, 
ranging from $100 fines (e.g., dental hygienist under AS 
08.32.180) to one year and/or $1000 fine (e.g., explosives 
handlers under AS 08.52. 080). Some provisions require licenses 
but provide no criminal penalty for practicing without 
one (e.g., AS 08.9 8.230, veterinary practice without a 
license subject only to civil injunction). 
39. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code provision of engaging in a business 
unlawfully will only apply to those businesses, professions 
or occupations for which a license certificate or permit 
is required but no penalty is provided by law or regulation 
for failing to obtain the license, certificate or permit, 
or engaging in the business after the permit has been 
suspended, revoked or terminated. The offense is one of 
strict liability; culpability need not be established 
as to any element of the offense. Note that when a license 
is required is not determined in the Revised Code. This 
determination is made by consulting the detailed provisions 
appearing elsewhere in the Alaska statute s. 
Engaging in a business unlawfully is a violation 
for the first offense. However, second and subsequent offenses 
are class B misdemeanors. 
VI. TD AS 11. 46. 685, .690, . 700. CRIMH1AL USURY IN THE 
FIRST AND SECOND DEGREES, POSSESSION OF USURIOUS LOAN 
RECORDS 
A. Existing Law 
AS 45. 4 5. 010 sets out limits on the legal rate of 
interest in the state. The rate of interest is generally 
set at 8% in AS 45.45. 0l0(a), though in ce rtain circumstances 
only 6% may be charged. With regard to contract or loan 
commitments dated after June 4, 1976, th e legal rate of 
40. 
interest may be no more than " five percentage points above 
the annual rate charged member banks for advances by the 
1 2th Federal Reserve District that prevailed on the 25th day 
of the month preceeding the commencement of the calendar 
quarter during which the contract or loan commitment is 
made. " AS 45. 45. 0l0 (b). Though no criminal penalties are 
provided for charging interest in an amount exceeding that per­
mitted by AS 45. 45. 010, a number of civil remedies are available 
to the borrower if the interest charged exceeds the legal 
rate . AS 4 5 . 4 5 . 0 3 0 , . 0 4 0 . 
The Alaska S mall Loans Act, AS 06.20, allows interest 
on loans charged by licensees under the act to exceed that 
otherwise permitted by law. AS 06 . 20. 01 0. On loans less than 
$1, 500, interest charged may be as high as 3% a month . 
AS 06. 20. 230. "Any person, copartnersh:i.p, association, or 
corporation and the several members, officers, directors, 
agents, and employees thereof who violate . 
are guilty of a misdemeanor." AS 06. 20. 320. 
B. The Code Provisions 
[AS 06. 20. 230] 
TD AS 11.46. 685-. 700 are inc lude d i n  the Revised 
Code to prohibit "loansharking" , conctuct that depends upon 
illegal harm, or the fear of such harm, to recover the loan 
and the invariably high interest charges attaching to it. 
[Loansharking] tends to thrive because, by virtue 
of the means of collection and the anticipated profit, 
the loanshark will take " risks" which do not appeal 
to legitimate lenders. Traditional offenses, such as 
assault or extortion, are regarded as inadequate to 
deal with this racket because actual use of force or 
4 1 .  
the making of threats are rarely necessary, and even 
more rarely are susceptible to legal proof. 
NATIONAL COM ISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, II 
WORKING PAPERS 89 3 ( 1 9  70) . 
Criminal usury in the first and second degree 
require that the defendant k nowingly charge interest at a 
rate exceeding 25 % .  The interest rate refers to a fixed 
amount ascertainable at the time the loan was made. The 
statutes do not cover high risk loans where the return on the 
loan is set at a certain percentage of profits. 
To be in violation of either statute the person 
must not be authorized or permitted by law to charge an 
interest rate exceeding 25 % .  A small business loan pursuant 
to AS 06. 20, for example, would therefore not violate the 
statute. Note that there is no requirement that the lender 
know he is not authorized by law to ch arge an interest rate 
exceeding 25% - ignorance of the law is no defense to either 
degree of criminal usury . 
Criminal usury in the second degree, TD AS 1 1.46.690, 
a violation, may be committed by making a single loan with 
interest in excess of 25 % .  Criminal usury in the first degree, 
a class C felony, requires proof that the loan was part of a 
" scheme or business of making or collecting usurious loans. " 
The crime of possession of usurious loan records, 
TD AS 11. 46. 700, a class A misdemeanor is designed as a 
tool against the loansharker who "may be able to avert proof 
of specific overt transactions but cannot conduct business 
without keeping records. " N . Y .  PENAL LAW § 190. 45, Commentary 
at 379 (McKinney 1975).  
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CHAPTER 56. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND DECENCY. 
ARTICLE 3 .  ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES .  
Sec t ion 
300 Escape in the First Der;rc·e 
310 Escape in the Second Degree 
320 Escape in the Third Degree 
330 Es'cape in the Fourth Degree 
3li0 Unlawful Evasion in the J-'irst Dep,ree 
350 Unlawful Evasion in the Second Degree 
360 Att cn�ting to Aid an Escape 
370 Criminally Ner;ligently Penni tting Escape 
380 Promoting Contraband 
390 Definitions 
. Sec. 11. 56. 300. ESCAPE IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A person com-
mits the crime of escape in the first degree if, without lawful author­
ity , he removes himself from official detention by means of a deadly 
weapon. 
(b) Escape in the first degree is a class A felony. 
Sec . 1 1 .  56. 310 .  ESCAPE IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person com-
mits the crime of escape in the second degree i f , wi thout lawful author­
ity, he 
(1)  removes himself from 
(A) offic ial detention on a charge of a felony or for 
extradition; 
(B) a correctional facility whi le under official de ten-
tion; or 
(C) official de tent ion and during the es cape , or at any 
time before be ing res tored to official detention , he possesses on 
or about his person a deadly weapon; or 
43. 










l l  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 








l A- L 
( 2 )  violate s sec. 350 of this chap ter and durinr; the time o f  
h i s  unlawful e va sion, o r  at· any tim,! before bei n g  res tored t o  official 
det.ention,  he por. �;essc,s on or about his person a deadly weapon. 
(h) Es cape in the s econd dq:,rce is a ·  class B fe] ony. 
S e c . 1 1. 56 . 37.0. ESCAPE IN Tl!E THIRD DEGREE. (a) A person co�nits 
the crime of escape in the third degree if he removes hims elf  from 
official de t ention during any lawful movement or activity incident to 
confinement within  a correct ion a l  facility on a charge of a misdemeanor. 
(h) Escape in the thi rd dcerec is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11.5 6.330 . ESCAPE IN THE FOURTH DEGR.EE. (a) 
. I 
A person co!:",:rn.ts 
the crime o f  escape in the fou r t h  degree i f ,  without l awful authority , 
he re1uovcs himself from offic L1l de tent i on or i f  he vio lates sec. 350 
of this chap ter anll ] eaves or atte111pti; to leave the state . 
2 0 /1  
• (b) Escape in the fourth decree i s  a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 1 1. 56. 340. UNLAWFUL EVASION IN THE FIRST DEGREE , (a) A 
person conmits the crime of unlawful evasion in th� first degree if he  
fails to return to official detention on  a charge of ; f elony following 
temporary leave .granted for a specific purpose or limited period , in­
cluding bu t not limited to p rivi leges granted under AS 33.30.150 , 33.-
30. 250 or 33.30. 260. 
(b) Unlawful evasion in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 1 1. 56 . 3 50. UNLAWFUL EVASION IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the cri me o f  unlawful evasion in the s econd degree if he 
fails to return to official detention fol lowing tempoiary l eave granted 
for a specific purpose or limited period , includine but not limited to 
privileges grante<l under AS 3 3 . 30.150 , 33. 30 . 250 or 3 3.30. 260 .  
(b) Unlawful evas ion in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 56.360. ATTEMPTING TO AID AN ESCAPE. (a) A person com-
mits the crime of attempting to aid an escape i f ,  with the intent o f  
4 4 . 
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, 
e ffec ting a person ' s  escape fro111 official detention , he a ltC'mpts to 
c1ssisl a person who :i.s u1 ,Jer official det c•.ntion to  escape. 
(b) Attempting to aid an escape :i r; a cla s s  C felony . 
Sec. 11. 5 6. 3 70. CRinINAJ.LY NEGL1GEN1T,Y PERMITTING ESCAPE. (a) 
A public servant who is requir ed by law to have charge of a person 
charged with or convi cted of a cr ime commits the crime of crind nally 
negligently pern1�t ting escape if with criminal negli gence he perm its a 
person under offic ial detention to  escape. 
(b) Crimina lly negligently permit. ting escape is  a cla s s  C felony. 
Sec. 11. 5 6.380. PROl<OTING CONTRABAND. 
crime of promoting contraband if he know:i.ngly 
(a) A person commits the 
(1) introduces , takes , conveys, or a t temp ts to introduc e ,  
take, or convey contra.band into or out of  a correctional facility ; or 
(2)  makes, obtains, possesses, or at: tC'mpts t o  c:ake , obtain , 
or possess anything he knows to  be contraband whil e under o ffic ial 
detention within a correctional fac ility. 
(b) Promot ing contraband i s  a class C felony. 
Sec. 1 1.56. 39 0 .  DEFINITIONS. As used in secs. 300 - 390 o f  this 
chapter , unless the context requires otherwise , 
(1) "contraband" means any article or thing whi ch persons 
confined in a correctional facility  are prohibited  by law , or by a 
regulation adopted by the conunissioner o f  hea_l th and social services, 
from obtaining , making! or possessing in that correc tional facilit y ;  
(2)  "correctional facility" means premises ,  or a portion of 
premises , used for the confinement o f  persons under o fficial d e tention ; 
(3) "official detention" means custody , arrest , surrender 
in lieu of arrest , or confinement under an order o f  a court in a 
criminal or j uvenile proceeding, other than an order of condit ional bail 
rele ase . 
45 . 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 56. Offenses Against Public Administration 
ARTICLE 3. ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11.5 6. 300 - . 35 0. ESCAPE ; UNLAWFUL EVASION 
A. Existing Law 
During the 1976 legislative session, the escape 
statute was substantially amended and the new crime of unlawful 
evasion was adopted . Escape, AS 11. 30. 090, was divided into 
three degrees. Unlawful evasion, AS 11. 30. 093, was divided 
into two degrees. Punishment for escape was set at imprisonment 
for from 3 months ( AS ll.30. 095 (c) ) to 5 y ears ( AS ll. 30. 095 ( a)), 
the authorized term depending on such factors as whether the 
escapee had committed a felony or a misdemeanor and whether 
the escapee possessed a deadly weapon. Punishment for unlawful 
evasion was set at imprisonment for a minimum of 30 days 
( AS ll.30.095 ( e)) and a maximum of one year. T he existing 
statute also includes provisions governing the " suspensions 
of imposition or execution of sentence or granting of parole" 
for persons convicted of escape or unlawful evasion. AS 11. 
30. 095 (f)- ( i). 
B. The Code Provisions 
While leaving most of the provisions of the escape 
and unlawful evasion statutes intact, the Revised Code makes 
three significant changes in existing law. These changes are 
summarized below: 
46. 
1. Four degrees of escape are recognized in the 
Code as compared to three in existing law. The 
new offense, escape in the first degree, TD AS 
1 1. 56. 300, is the most serious escape offense 
in the Code and is classified as a class A felony. 
The crime requires that a person remove himself 
from official detention by means of a deadly 
weapon. The term " official detention" is defined 
in TD AS 11. 56. 390 (2) as "custody, arrest or 
surrender in lieu of arres t, or confinenent pur­
suant to an order of a court in a criminal or 
juvenile proceeding, other than an order of 
conditional bail release. " This definition 
is not intended to cover placement of a 
juvenile in a foster home pursuant to a temporary 
custody order. 
2. The Code classifies all escapes from correctional 
facilities (defined in TD AS 11.56. 390 (3) as 
"premises, or a portion of premises, used for the 
confineP1ent of persons under official detention") 
as escape in the second degree, a class B felony. 
TD AS 11. 56.310 (1) (B). Existing law differen­
tiates between an escapee who has committed a 
f elony and one who h as committed a rnisdeneanor ; 
an escape by a misdemeanant is classified 
as a misdeneanor. The Subcomrniss ion concluded 
that the danger to society resulting f roM correc-
47. 
tional facility escapes is substantial, regardless 
of whether the escapee is a felon or misdemeanant. 
The classification of all - correctional facility 
escapes as serious felonies is consistent with 
the Code provision on the j ustifiable use of force 
in preventing an escape from a correctional facil­
ity, TD AS 11.21. 210, Tentative Draft, Part 2 at 
44 (deadly force may be used to the extent 
reasonably believed necessary to prevent any 
escape from a correctional facility). Note, 
however, that the Code continues to distinguish 
between other escapes from official detention 
( e.g. , escape from custody of a peace officer) 
based on th e class of offense comrnitte0 by the 
escapee. Compare TD AS 11. 56. 310 (1) (A) with 
TD AS 1 1. 56.330. 
3. The offense of escape in the third degree, TD 
AS 11. 56. 320, a class C felony, covers escapes 
" during any lawful movement or activity incident 
to confinement within a correctional facility 
on a charge of a misdemeanor. " Conduct of this 
nature would include an escape from a courtroom 
by a convicted misdemeanant prior to being 
transported to a correctional facility. It 
would also include an escape by a person 
who is confined in a correctional facility 
while he is being transported incident to that 
conf inement, e. g. , transportation to a dentist. 
48. 
If a felon escapes under such circumstances 
he has committed e scape i n  the second degree, 
TD AS 11. 56. 310 (1) (A), a class B felony. 
II. TD AS 11. 56. 360. ATTEMPTING TO AID AN ESCAPE 
Existing Law - The Code Provision 
TD AS 11 . 56. 360 prohi bits conduct that i s  more 
l i kely to occur i n  theory than i n  practice. Nevertheless, the 
seriousness of the prohi bited conduct, the fact that existing 
l aw i nsures comparable coverage (see AS 11. 30. 080, aiding 
e scape from confinement; AS 11. 30. 130, rescue) and the i nappli ­
cability of the more general attempt and complici ty statutes 
to the prohi bited conduct, require that the crime of " attempting 
to aid an e scape" appear i n  the Revised Code . In di scussing 
the coverage of TD AS 11. 56. 360, it  i s  first useful to consider 
what i s  not covered by the statute. 
The statute does not cover conduct of the person who, 
with i ntent to promote an escape, aids or abets a person in 
committing an escape or atte mpted escape. F or e xample , con-
sider the case where David, a prisoner i n  a corre ctional facility, 
is  furnishe d e scape plans by Doug, who is  outside the facility. 
If David atte�pts to escape or succeeds in escaping, both David 
and Doug would be gui lty of some form of e scape or attempted 
escape. Doug would be accountable for David's behavior through 
the Code's general principles of complicity. See TD AS 11. 16. 110. 
What the Code provision on attem9ting to ai d an e scape 
does cover, however, is  the conduct by Doug who, wi thout prio� 
4 9 .  
plan with David, attempts gratuitous ly to "rescue" David from 
official detention and David does not want to have anything to 
do with Doug ' s plan. In such a situation David has committed 
no crime since he did not attempt to es cape or es cape. As 
Doug ' s  criminal liability is dependent on David's conduct, Doug 
could not be charged as an access ory to David's crime: David 
has committed no crime. 
The Code provision on attempting to ai d an escape insures 
that, in the second hypoth etical, Doug could be charged with 
a crime. Doug has committed the cri me of attempting to aid 
an escape, a class C felony, since he has acted with the intent 
of effecting David's escape and has attempted to assist him in 
escaping. 
III. TD AS 11. 56. 370. CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENTLY PERMITTING 
ESCAPE 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11 . 30. 120 provides 1 - 5 years imprisonment for 
a '' peace officer who voluntarily or through negligence allows 
a pers on or prisoner committed to or i n  his custody to 
e scape, or intentionally refuses to receive i nto his custody 
a person or prisoner lawfully committed to hirn." 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code retains the coverage of the exi sting 
statute but broadens i t  beyond the peace officer to cover 
the actions of " any public servant who i s  authori zed and 
required by law to have charge of any person charged with or 
50. 
convicted of any crime." Such a person commits the crime of 
criminally negligently permitting escape if "with criminal 
negligence he allows or permits a person under official 
detention to escape." The potential danger resulting from 
such escapes justifies the imposition of criminal liability 
based on criminally negligent behavior. The offense is 
classified as a class C felony. 
IV. TD AS 11.56.390. PROMOTING CONTRABAND 
A. Existing Law 
AS 33.30.055 prohibits a person from, contrary to 
a rule or regulation of the Commissioner of Health and Social 
Services, (1) attempting to introduce contraband, as 
defined by the Commissioner, into or out of a correctional 
facility or (2) taking or sending or attempting to take or send 
contraband, as defined by the Commissioner, from a facility. 
B. The Code Provision 
The crime of promoting contraband, a class C felony, 
prohibits two acts. The first, described in paragraph (1), is 
the introduction or attempted introduction of contraband into 
or out of a correctional facility. With regard to the culpability 
requirement for this conduct, the defendant must know he is 
introducing something into a correctional facility and be at 
least reckless as to whether the substance is contraband. 
Paragraph (2) prohibits a person under official 
detention in a correctional facility from making, obtaining, 
possessing or attempting to make, obtain or possess contraband. 
In this instance, the person must know that the substance he 
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CHAPTER 56. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. 
ARTICLE 4. OFFENSES RELATING TO JUDICIAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
Section 
510 Influencing a Witness 
530 Receiving a Bribe by a Witness 
540 Tampering with a Witness 
550 Influencing a Juror 
580 Receiving a Bribe by a Juror 
590 Jury Tampering 
600 Misconduct by a Juror 
605 Receiving Unauthorized Communications by a Juror 
610 Tampering with Physical Evidence 
620 Simulating Legal Process 
Sec. 11.56.510. INFLUENCING A WITNESS. (a) A person com its the crime 
of influencing a witness if he 
(1) uses physical force on anyone, damages the property of anyone, 
or threatens anyone with intent to 
(A) improperly influence a witness; or 
(B) retaliate against a witness because of his testimony in 
an official proceeding; or 
(2) confers, offers to confer or agrees to confer a benefit upon a 
witness with intent to improperly influence that witness. 
(b) Infl�encing a witness is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11.56.530. RECEIVING A BRIBE BY A WITNESS. (a) A person commits 
the crime of receiving a bribe by a witness if he knowingly solicits, accepts 
or agrees to accept a benefit upon an agreement or understandi11g that he will 
be improperly influenced as a witness. 
(b) Receiving a bribe by a witness is a class B felony. 
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crime of tampering with a witness if he knowingly induces or attempts to 
2 induce a witness to 
3 (1) testify falsely, offer misleading testimony or unlawfully 
4 withhold testimony in an official proceeding; or 
5 (2) absent himself from an official proceeding to which he has 
6 been summoned. 
7 
8 
(b) Tampering with a witness is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.56.550. INFLUENCING A JUROR. (a) A person commits the crime 
9 of influencing a juror if he 
(1) uses physical force on anyone, damages the property of anyone, 



















(A) influence a juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other 
action as a juror; or 
(B) retaliate against a juror because of his serving as a 
juror or taking any action as a juror; 
(2) uses physical force on a juror, damages the property of a 
juror, or threatens a juror with intent to influence the outcome of an 
official proceeding; or 
(3) confers, offers to confer, or agrees to confer a benefit upon 
a juror with intent to 
(A) influence the juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other 
action as a juror; or 
(B) influence the outcome of an official proceeding. 
(b) Influencing a juror is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11. 56. 580. RECEIVING A BRIBE BY A JUROR. (a) A person commits 
the crime of receiving a bribe by a juror if he knowingly solicits, accepts, 
or agrees to accept a Lenefit upon an agreement or understanding that his 
vote, decision, opinion, or other action as a juror will be influenced. (b) 
L 1\- L '2 0 I\ 
Receiving a bribe by a juror is a class B felony. 
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Sec. 11.56. 590. JURY TAMPERING. (a) A person commits the crime of 
2 jury tampering if he directly or indirectly communicates with a juror other 



























(1) influence the juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other action 
as a juror; or 
(2) influence the outcome of the official proceeding. 
(b) Jury tampering is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. 56. 600. MISCONDUCT BY A JUROR. (a) A person commits the crime 
of misconduct by a juror if, being a juror, he promises or agrees, before the 
submission of any part of an official proceeding to a jury for deliberation, 
to vote for or agree to a verdict for or against a party in the official pro­
ceeding, or otherwise to influence the outcome of the official proceeding. 
(b) Misconduct by a juror is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. 56.605. RECEIVING UNAUTHORIZED C0l1MUNICATIONS BY A JUROR. (a) 
A person commits the crime of receiving unauthorized communications by a 
juror if, being a juror, he receives a communication, other than as permitted 
by the rules governing the official proceeding, in relation to the official 
proceeding without im ediately disclosing the communication to the court. 
(b) Receiving unauthorized communications by a juror is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.56.610. TAMPERING WITH PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. 
mits the crime of tampering with physical e vidence if he 
(a) A person com-
(1) destroys, mutilates, alters, suppresses, conceals or removes 
physical evidence with intent to impair its verity or availability in an 
official proceeding or a criminal investigation; 
(2) makes, presents or uses physical evidence, knowing it to be 
false, with intent to mislead a juror who is engaged in an official proceed­
ing or a public scrvRnt who is engaged in an official proceeding or a 
LA- L 2 0/1 54. 
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11 criminal investigation; 
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(3) prevents the production of physical evidence in an official 



























or deception against anyone; or 
(4) does any act described by (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection 
with intent to prevent the institution of an official proceeding. 
(b) Tampering with physical evidence is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. 56. 620. SIMULATING LEGAL PROCESS. (a) A person commits the 
crime of simulating legal process if with intent to cause the recipient to tak 
an action on it he issues, sends or delivers 
(1) a request for payment of money on behalf of any creditor that 
in form and substance simulates any legal process issued by any court of this 
state; or 
(2) any purported summons, subpoena or other legal process knowin 
that said process was not issued or authorized by a court or other official 
body authorized by law to do so. 
(b) Simulating legal process is a class A misdemeanor. 
55. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 56. Offenses Against Public Administration 
ARTICLE 4. OFFENSES RELATING TO JUDICIAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11.56.510, .530, .540. INFLUENCING A WITNESS, 
RECEIVING A BRIBE BY A WITNESS, TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS 
A. Existing Law 
"Influencing witnesses, judges or jurors or 
obstructing administration of justice," AS 11.30.320, pro­
vides a maximum five year penalty for the violation of any 
of the five subsections of that statute. Subsection (1) 
covers the person who "corruptly, or by threats or force, 
or by a threatening letter or communication, endeavors to 
influence, intimidate, or impede a witness in a court of 
this state or before a committing magistrate." Subsection (2) 
provides specific coverage for retaliation against a witness 
by injuring him or his property " because of his attending or 
having attended a court." The "catch-all" provision in 
subsection (5) refers to the person who "corruptly or by 
threats or force, or by threatening letter or communication, 
influences, obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice." 
A person who procures another to commit the crime 
of perjury is guilty of " Subornation of perjury," AS 11.30.010, 
punishable by one - five years imprisonment. AS 11 . 3 0 • 0 2 0 ( c ) • 
B. The Code Provisions 
TD AS 11.56.510 and .540 
56. 
gather the various 
methods whereby one may improperly interfere with a witness. 
If a person retaliates against a witness or attempts to 
improperly influence a witness by physical force, threat, or 
bribe, the crime committed is influencing a witness, TD AS 
11.56.510, a class B felony. If the defendant otherwise 
attempts to influence a witness, the crime cor.1rnitted is 
tampering with a witness, TD AS 11.56.540, a class A misde-
meaner. If the witness solicits, receives or agrees to 
accept a bribe, the witness commits the crime of receiving 
a bribe by a witness, TD AS 11.56.530, a class B felony. 
" Witness" is defined in TD AS 11.56.900(8) to include 
not only those persons summoned or appearing in an official 
proceeding hut also those persons whom the "defendant believes 
may be called as a witness in an official proceeding, present 
or future." This definition avoids confusion as to when an 
individual actually becomes a witness and emphasizes that the 
harm in the conduct prohibited in TD AS 11.56.510-.540 is the 
attempt to interfere with the course of an official proceeding. 
" Official proceeding" is defined in TD AS 11.56.900(4) as one 
heard before "a legislative, judicial, administrative or 
other governmental body or official authorized to hear evidence 
under oath." 
l. TD AS 11.56.510. Influencing a Witness 
The crime of influencing a witness occurs when a 
person uses physical force on anyone, damages property of anyone 
or threatens anyone [for definition of "threat", see TD AS 
11.46.990 (10) (Tentative Draft, Part 2, at 99-100)] with intent 
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to " improperly influence a witness" or with an intent to 
"retaliate against a witness because of his testimony in an 
official proceeding." 
The term "improperly influence a witness" is defined 
in TD AS 11. 56.900 (1). The term includes causing or inducing 
the failure to testify [subsection (C) ], an attempt to have a 
witness avoid legal process summoning him to testify [sub­
section (B)] as well as causing or inducing a witness to offer 
false or misleading testimony or withhold testimony [subsection 
(A)]. A person also "improperly influences a witness" when 
he causes the witness to engage in tampering with physical 
evidence [subsection (D)]. 
Influencing a witness is also committed when a 
person "confers, offers to confer or agrees to confer a benefit 
upon a witness with intent to improperly influence that witness. " 
The statute parallels the proposed general bribery statute, 
TD AS 11. 56.100 (discussed in Tentative Draft, Part 2, Commentary 
at 93-94) and is similar to the existing offense of subornation 
of perjury, AS 11.30.0l0 (b). For a discussion of the term 
"benefit", see Tentative Draft, Part 2, Commentary at 87-89. 
2. TD AS 11.56. 520. Receiving a bribe by a witness 
Paralleling the existing and proposed general bribery 
statues which punish both the offeror and receiver of a bribe, 
TD AS 11. 56.530 provides that it is a crime for a witness to 
solicit, receive or agree to accept a bribe upon an agreement 
or understanding that he will be improperly influenced as a 
witness. 
58. 
3. TD AS 11.56.540. Tampering With a Witness 
The crime of tampering with a witness differs in 
three respects from the crime of influencing a witness. First, 
the means by which tampering with a witness is committed 
(inducing or attempting to induce) are not as culpable or as 
overt as the means specified in the crime of influencing a witness 
(force, threat or bribery) . Tampering with a witness is 
consequently graded as a class A misdemeanor. 
Second, unlike the proposed statute on influencing 
a witness, an attempt to induce a prospective witness to avoid 
process is not made an offense. This distinction is discussed 
in the Commentary to the Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal 
Code § 5020 at 414. 
[W]hile [TD AS 11.56.510] make [s] it unlawful to 
use a bribe or threat to induce a witness to avoid 
legal process, [TD AS 11.56.540] does not bar an 
attempt to achieve that objective by persuasion or 
argument. A defense attorney, for example, would 
not be prohibited from attempting by persuasion or 
pleading to induce a witness to avoid process by 
leaving the state. Although the attorney's activity 
might raise certain ethical issues, it should not 
give use to criminal liability, since neither the 
means used nor the objective sought is unlawful 
in itself. 
Finally, while influencing a witness includes acts 
done with intent to induce a witness to " withhold testimony" 
[TD AS 11. 56. 510 (1) (A) ; TD AS 11. 56. 900 (1) (A}), the crime of 
tamperi�g with a witness requires an intent to induce a 
witness to "unlawfully withhold testimony." Thus while it 
would not be tampering with a witness to persuade a witness 
to lawfully refuse to testify on grounds of personal 
59. 
privilege, i.e., privilege against self-incrimination, it 
would be influencing a witness to attempt to do so by force, 
threat or bribe. 
II. TD AS 11.56.550, .580, .590, .600. INFLUENCI�G A JUROR, 
RECEIVING A BRIBE BY A JUROR, JURY TAMPERING, MISCONDUCT 
BY A JUROR 
A. Existing Law 
" Influencing witnesses, judges or jurors or ob­
structing administration of justice, " AS 11.30.320, provides 
a maximum five year penalty for the violation of any of the 
five subsections of that statute. Subsection (1) covers the 
person who " corruptly, or by threats or force, or by a threaten­
ing letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, 
or impede . . a grand or petit juror." Subsection (3) 
provides specific coverage of retaliation against a grand or 
petit juror by injuring him " because of a verdict or indictment 
assented to by him, or because of his being or having been 
a juror." The ''catch-all" provision in subsection (5) refers 
to the person who "corruptly or by threats or force, or by 
threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs 
or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede 
the due administration of justice." 
AS 11.30.040 provides penalties for bribing a 
" judicial officer, " a term defined in AS 11.30.060(2) to 
include a person " summoned as a juror in a court, in an inquest, 
or before any officer, from the time he is summoned." Thus, 
60. 
bribery of a juror and accepting a bribe by a juror are now 
prohibited in AS 11.30.040 and AS 11.30.050. 
The contempt statute, AS 9.50.010, provides in 
subsection (11) that it is contempt for a juror to receive 
"a communication from a party or other person in respect to 
[an action or proceeding] without immediately disclosing it 
to the court." 
B. The Code Provisions 
TD AS 11.56.550 and .570 gather the various 
methods whereby one may improperly interfere with a juror. 
Similar to the distinction it draws between influencing a 
witness and tampering with a witness, the Revised Code distin­
guishes between different forms of conduct intended to interfere 
with a juror. If a person retaliates against a juror or 
attempts to influence his vote or affect the outcome of an 
official proceeding by physical force, by threat, or by bribe, 
the crime committed is influencing a juror, TD AS 11.56.550, 
a class B felony. If the person attempts to otherwise interfere 
with a juror, the crime is jury tampering, a class C felony. 
If the juror solicits, receives or agrees to accept 
a bribe, the juror commits the crime of receiving a bribe by 
a juror, TD AS 11.56.580, a class B felony. If the juror 
otherwise agrees to vote for or against a party prior to 
submission of the official proceeding to the jury, he commits 
the cr�me of misconduct by a juror, a class C felony. If the 
juror receives unauthorized communications without disclosing 
the communication to the court, he commits the crime of 
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receiving unauthorized communications by a juror, TD AS 
11. 56. 605, a class B misdemeanor. " Juror" is defined in 
TD AS 11. 56. 900 ( 3) as "a person who is a member of an im­
paneled jury or a person who has been drawn or summoned to 
attend as a prospective juror." 
1. TD AS 11.56. 550. Influencing a Juror 
The crime of influencing a juror occurs when a person 
uses physical force on anyone, damages property of anyone or 
threatens anyone with intent to "influence a juror's vote, 
opinion, decision or other action as a juror." The crime 
is also committed, pursuant to subsection (2), when the person 
acts with an intent to retaliate against the juror because 
of his serving as a juror. This subsection covers conduct 
where the defendant does not necessarily intend to influence 
the juror's vote. A person, for example, who assaults a juror 
because he was angry with the verdict would violate subsection (2). 
Influencing a juror is also comITlitted when a person 
confers, offers to confer or agrees to confer a benefit upon 
a juror with intent to influence the juror or affect the out­
come of the official proceeding. Note that the Code does not 
include a juror within the definition of "public servant" . Con­
sequently, a juror is not subject to the general bribery 
statutes. A separate provision is necessary. 
2. TD AS 11. 56. 580. Receiving a Bribe by a Juror 
Paralleling the existing and proposed general bribery 
statutes which punish both the offeror and receiver of a bribe, 
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TD AS 11.56.580 provides that it is a crime for a juror to 
solicit, receive or agree to accept a bribe upon an agreement 
or understanding that his vote or other action as a juror will 
be influenced. 
3. TD AS 11.56.590. Jury Tampering 
The crime of jury tampering differs in only one 
respect from the crime of influencing a juror. The means by 
which tampering with a juror is committed (communicating with 
intent to influence) are less culpable than the means specified 
in the crime of influencing a juror (force, threat or bribery) . 
Tampering with a juror is consequently only graded as a class C 
felony as compared to the B felony classification for influencing 
a juror. 
4. TD AS 11.56.600. Misconduct by a Juror 
The crime of misconduct by a juror is similar to the 
crime of receiving a bribe by a juror in that both require that 
the juror improperly agree to be influenced as a juror. However, 
unlike the crime of receiving a bribe by a juror, the crime of 
misconduct by a juror does not require that the juror agree 
to be influenced as a consequence of the acceptance of a 
benefit. Mere agreements to vote for a party in the official 
proceeding or to otherwise influence the official proceeding 
are proscribed in TD AS 11.56.600, a class C felony. 
5. TD AS 11.56.605. Receiving Unauthorized 
Communications by a Juror 
This section prohibits the receipt of any unauthorized 
63. 
communication by a juror without immediately disclosing the 
communication to the court. The juror who allows unauthorized 
communications to be made to him calls into question his 
impartiality. The danger that such communications represent 
to the integrity of the jury verdict merits criminalization 
of both the person who initiates it (TD AS 11.56.590, jury 
tampering) and the juror who knowingly allows it to be made. 
III. TD AS 11.56.610. 'l'AMPERING WITH PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
A. Existing Law 
Both the preparin� of false evidence and the offering 
of false evidence are currently designated as felonies under 
AS 11.30.290-.300. Penalties of up to two years imprisonment 
and/or a fine of not more than $10,000 may be imposed on one 
who prepares a "false or antedated book, paper, record, 
instrument in writing, or other matter or thing" with the 
intent that it be fraudulently produced at a trial, proceeding 
or inquiry as genuine. AS 11.30.300, .310. Identical penalties 
apply to one who offers as genuine, a "book, paper, document, 
or other instrument in writing" in evidence at a "trial, 
proceeding, inquiry, or investigation," knowing the article 
to be forged, antedated or fraudulently altered. AS 11.30.290, 
.310. Note that the "preparing" statute covers "other matter[s] 
or thing [s]" but does not refer to use in an investigation, 
while the "offering" statute is limited to written instruments 
but covers investigations. 
AS 11.30.315, imposes misdemeanor rather than 
64. 
felony penalties of imprisonment for one year and/or a fine 
of $1,000 on one who, with intent to prevent evidence from 
being discovered or produced, " wilfully destroys, alters or 
conceals evidence concerning the commission of a crime or 
evidence which is being sought for production during an 
investigation, inquiry or trial." 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code combines these various existing 
statutes into one provision designed to complement other 
sections that protect official proceedings from being 
intentionally subverted. The Code provision prohibits 
tampering with "physical evidence", a term defined at TD 
AS 11. 56. 900 (5) to mean any "article, object, document, record 
or other thing of physical substance. "  Proceedings pro-
tected include both criminal investigations and " official 
proceedings", a term defined at TD AS 11.56.900 (4) to mean 
proceedings before governmental bodies and officials authorized 
to hear evidence under oath. 
Subsection (1) of the proposed section is directed 
at intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, conceal­
ment or removal of physical evidence that impairs its verity 
or availability in criminal investigation or official pro-
ceeding. Subsection (2) prohibits making, presenting or using 
physical evidence known to be false in an effort to mislead 
jurors or public servants engaged in official proceedings or 
criminal investigations. Subsection (3) prohibits the use of 
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force, deception, or threats to prevent the production of 
physical evidence in official proceedings and criminal investi­
gations. In subsection (4) , the proposed statute criminalizes 
conduct identical to that proscribed by subsections (1) -(3) 
but engaged in with the intent to prevent the institution of 
an official proceeding. Consistent with the Code's overall 
rejection of the defense of impossibility, TD AS 11. 56. 610 does 
not require that the physical evidence be admissible or 
material. 
IV. TD AS 11.56.620. SIMULATING LEGAL PROCESS 
A. Existing Law 
Simulation of legal process is currently prohibited 
by AS 08.24.320 which provides that " [f]orms of demand or 
notice or other documents drawn to resemble court process may 
not be used by collection agencies in the collection of bills, 
accounts or other indebtedness." While AS 08.24.360 provides 
punishment by imprisonment for up to three months and/or a max­
imum fine of $500, application of the existing statute is limited 
to licensed collection agencies and person having managerial 
control of them. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code provision is designed to protect the legiti­
macy of governmental administration and prevent the impairr.1ent 
of public confidence in genuine documents. Though aiMed at 
discouraging use of misleading documents in the debt collection 
process, the section is not subject to the existing limitation 
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that the r.LCtor ceprese1,t a collection agency. Under the Code 
provision any person who, with "intent to cause the recipient 
to take an action on it, " issues a form that falsely s imulates 
legal process acts in violation of the section. As in existing 
law, the offense applies both to civil and criminal process o f  
any court. Subsection (a) (2) expands the coverage of subsection 
{a) (1) in nondebt situations to cover si�ulation of process 
of any court or official body, includinq those of other juris-
di_ctions. Statutory aiithori ty of state agencies and other 
official bodies to issue subpoenas or other legal process is 
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Clll\PTER 56. Of·'PENSES l\Gl\INST PUBLIC ADtHNISTRl\TION. 
l\RTICLE 5. OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. 
Resisting or Interfering with Arrest 
720 Refusing to Assist a Peace Officer or Judicial Officer 
730 Refusing to Assist in an Emergency 
740 Civil Liability for Emergency l\id 
770 Hindering Prosecution in the First Degree 
780 Hinderin9 Prosecution in the Second Degree 
790 Compounding 
800 Making a False Report 
810 Making a False Bomb Report 
820 Tampering with Public Records 
830 Impersonating a Public Servant 
Sec. 11. So. 700. RESISTING OR INTW�FERING WITH A'RREST. (a) A person 
conuni ts the crime of resisting or interfering with arrest if, knowing that a 
peo.ce officer is making o.n arrest, with the intent of preventing the officer :
i 
lfrom effecting the arrest, he resists the arrest of himself or interferes 
I 
twith the arrest of another by 
\ (1) using or threatening to use physical force; 
r
I 
(2) committing any degree of criminal mischief; or 
I (3) any means that creates a substantial risk of physical injury 
o any i)erson. 
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Sec. 11.56. 720. REFUSING TO ASSIST A PEACE OFFICER OR JUDICIAL OFFICER. 
3 (a) A person commits the offense of refusing to assist a peace officer or 
4 judicial officer if, upon a request, command or order by a person he knows to 
5 be a peace officer or judicial officer, he unreasonably refuses or fails to 
6 make a good faith effort to assist that person in the exercise of his offi-
7 cial duties. 
8 (b) Refusing to assist a peace officer or judicial officer is a viol-
9 at ion. 
10 Sec. 11. 56. 730. REFUSING TO ASSIST IN AN EMERGENCY. (a) A person 
11 commits the crime of refusing to assist in ah emergency if he unreasonably 
12 disobeys a request, command or order of a person he knows to be a member of a 
13 fire department or other public or private organization which deals with 
14 emergencies involving danger to life or property if that request, command or 
15 order relates to the safety of any person or protection of any �roperty in 
16 the vicinity of an emergency. 
17 
18 
(b) Refusing to assist in an emergency is a class B misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 56. 740. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR EMERGENCY AID. (a) A person who, 
19 without expecting compensation, assists a person pursuant to sec. 720 or 730 
20 of this chapter is not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or 
21 omission in rendering such aid. 
22 (b) This section does not preclude liability for civil damages as a 
23 result of reckiess, wilful, wanton or intentional misconduct. 
24 Sec. 11.56. 770. HINDERING PROSECUTION IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A 
25 person commits the crime of hindering prosecution in the first degree if he 
26 
renders assistance to a person who has committed a crime punishable as a 
27 felony, with reckless disregard that that person has engaged in the conduct 
28 constituting the crime, and with intent to 
29 
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of that person; or 
(2) assist that person in profiting or benefiting from the 
commiss ion of the crime . 
(b) For purposes of this section , a person "renders assistance" to 
another if he 
(1) harbors or conceals that person; 
(2) warns that person of impending discovery or apprehens ion; 
(3) provides or aids in providing .that person with money, trans-
portation, a deadly weapon , a dangerous instrument, a disguise or other means 
of avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(4) prevents or obs tructs, by means of physical force, threat or 
deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid in the dis covery or 
apprehension of that person; 
(5) suppresses by an act of concealment , alteration or des truction 
physical evidence which might aid in the dis covery or apprehensjon of that 
person; or 
cr:u,1e. 
(6) aids that person in securing or protecting the proceeds of the 
(c) Hindering prosecution in the first degree is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. 5 6. 7 80 . HINDERING PROSECUTION IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of hindering prosecution in the second degree if he 
renders assistance to a person who has committed a crime punishable more 
severely than a class B misdemeanor , with intent to 
(1) hinder the apprehension , prosecution, conviction or punishment 
of that person; or 
(2) assist that person in profiting or benefiting from the com­
mission of the crime. 
(b)  For purpose� of this section, a perslm "renders assistance" to 
another if he does any act des cribed in sec. 7 70 (b) of this chapter. 
L A- L 2 O A  
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(c) Hindering prosecution in the second degree is a class  B misde-
2 meanor. 
3 Sec. 1 1 . 56 . 7 9 0 .  COMPOUNDING. (a) A person commits the crime of com-
4 pounding if , unless authorized by AS 12 . 45 . 120 or 12 . 45 . 1 3 0 ,  he 
5 (1)  confers, offers to confer , or agrees to confer a benefit on 
6 another in cons ideration of that person ' s  concealing an offense , refraining 
7 from initiating or aiding in the prosecution of an ·offense , or withholding 
8 evidence of an offense ; or 
9 (2 )  accepts or  agrees to  accept a benefit in consideration of his 
10 concealing an offense ,  refraining from initiating or aiding in the prosecu-
11 tion of an offense , or withholding evidence -of an offense. 
1 2  
13 
(b) Compounding is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 1 1 . 5 6 . 800 . MAKING A FALSE REPORT. (a) A person commits the crime 
14 of making a false report if he knowingly 
15  (1) gives false information to a peace officer with the intent of 
16 implicating another in a crime; or 
1 7  












(2) makes or causes to be made a false report to a peace officer, 
fireman , security officer or a public or private organization which deals 
with emergencies involving danger to life or property that a fire or other 
incident calling for an emergency response has occurred. 
(b) Making a false report is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11 . 5 6 . 810 . MAKING A FALSE BOMB REPORT. (a) A person commits the 
crime of making a false bomb report if he knowingly makes or causes to be 
made a false report to any person that a bomb or other explosive or incendi­
ary device is in a position to create a risk of harm. 
(b) Making a false bomb report is a class C felony. 
Sec. 1 1 . 5 6 . 820 . TAMPERING WITH PUBLIC RECORDS. (a) A person commits 
the crime of tampering with public records if he knowingly 
(1 ) makes a false entry in or falsely alters a public record;  or 
7 1 .  
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(2) destroys , mutilates , suppresses , conceals , removes or other-
2 wise impairs the verity , legibility or availability of a public record , 
3 knowing that he lacks the authority to do so. 
4 
5 
(b) Tampering with public records is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec . 11. 56. 830. IMPERSONATING A PUBLIC SERVANT. (a) A person commits 
6 the crime of impersonating a public servant if he falsely pretends to be a 
7 public servant and does any act in that capacity. 
8 
9 
1 0  or 
1 1  
(b) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that 
(1) the office the actor pretended to hold did not in fact exist; 
(2) the actor was in fact a public servant different than the one 
1 2  he falsely pretended to be. 
1 3  (c)  Impersonating a public servant is a class B misdemeanor. 
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CHAPTER 56. 
ARTICLE 5. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Offenses Against Public Administration 
OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
COMMENTARY 
I. TD AS 11.56. 700. RESISTING OR INTERFERING WITH ARREST 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.30.210 provides that it is a misdemeanor, 
punishable by a maximum $10 0 fine and/or 30 days in j ail, 
for a person to " wilfully obstruct a peace officer in 
making , or attempting to make, a lawful arrest." There is n0 
right to use physical force in resisting an unlawful, but 
otherwise peaceful, arrest. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 
(Alaska 1969) ; Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 . 908 (Alaska 1970 ) .  
See also Tentative Draft, Part 2, Commentary at 66. 
B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 11.56.70 0, a class B misdemeanor, prohibits a 
person from resisting the arrest of h�mself or interfering with 
the arrest of another by any of three methods. The person must 
know that a peace officer is making an arrest and act with the 
intent of preventing the officer from effecting an arrest. 
Resisting or interfering with an arrest is usually 
manifested by physical force directed at the arresting 
officer. Subsection (a) (1 )  is therefore limited to resisting 
or interfering with an arrest by the use, or threatened use, 
of physical force. A person also violates TD AS 11.56.700 by 
resisting arrest or interfering with the arrest of another by 
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doing any act that produces a "substantial risk of physical 
injury, " (i.e., fleeing in an automobile at high speeds through 
a residential area) or by committing any degree of criminal 
mischief (i.e., tampering with the officer ' s  squad car) . Mere 
non-submission to an arrest does not reach the level of 
resisting or interfering with arrest. As noted in the Commentary 
to the Kawaii Penal Code : 
One who runs away from an arresting officer or 
who makes an effort to shake off the officer ' s  
detaining arm might be said to obstruct the 
officer physically, but this type of evasion or 
minor scuffling is not unusual in an arrest, 
nor would it be desirable to make it a criminal 
offense to flee arrest. In this case the proper 
social course is to authorize police pursuit 
and use of reasonable force to effect the arrest. 
If the actor is captured, he may be convicted 
of the underlying offense . If conviction cannot 
be had, it would be a grave injustice to permit 
prosecution for an unsuccessful effort, by an 
innocent man, to evade the police. 
* * * 
Cases of interference which do not involve 
force or risk of bodily injury, but which present 
serious social dangers are included under [TD AS 
11.56.770-.780] as cases of hindering prosecution. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1026, Commentary at 251 CSpecial Pamphlet 
l'J 7S} 
II. TD AS 11.56.720. REFUSING TO ASSIST A PEACE OFFICER 
OR JUDICIAL OFFICER 
A. Existing Law 
At least four statutes in existing law require a 
citizen to aid a peace officer, judge or magistrate. AS 11.30.200 
requires a person to assist a peace officer, judge or magistrate 
"in the execution of his office in the preservation of the 
peace, or the arrest of a person for a breach of the peace, 
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or the service of process." A person who "neglects or refuses 
to render assistance" commits a misdemeanor punishable 
by six months in jail or fine of $500. 
AS 12.25.020 provides that a judge or magistrate may 
order any person to arrest another for a crime committed in the 
judge's or magistrate's presence, but does not provide a 
penalty for refusal, except as presumably applied pursuant 
to AS 11.30.200. A person who is commanded by two persons 
who are district judges, magistrates, peace officers, or 
chief executive officers of a city, town, village, or settle­
ment to give aid juring a riot and neglects to do so "is 
considered one of the rioters, and may be treated and punish­
able accordingly." AS 12.60.200 
Finally, AS 18.65.100 recognizes that the Depart­
ment of Public Safety and members of the State Troopers 
"may command the assistance of any able-bodied person to 
aid in accomplishing the purposes of§§ 20 - 110 of this 
chapter [police protection]." 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code replaces the scattered provisions in 
existing law with a sin�le provision making it a violation 
to unreasonably refuse or fail to make a good faith effort 
to assist a peace officer, judge or magistrate in the exercise 
of his official duties. Though the Subcommission had not 
completed the final definition of the term "violation" at 
the time of the nrafting ot this part of the Tentative Draft, 
it is anticipated that a violation will be a noncriminal 
offense punishable by fine. 
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The Code provision requires that the citizen know 
that the person requesting assistance is a peace officer or 
judicial officer. Further, the citizen must unreasonably 
refuse to assist the officer. Thus, the Code provision does 
not authorize peace officers or judicial officers to foist 
unreasonably dangerous duties upon citizens. Neither 
does it authorize them to command citizens to aid them in 
the performance of their every day duties. 
III. TD AS 11.56.730. REFUSING TO ASSIST IN AN EMERGENCY 
The Code Provision 
TD AS 11.56.730 is new to existing law. The statute 
provides that it is a B misdemeanor to refuse to obey a request, 
command or order of a person known "to be a member of a fire 
department or other public or private organization which deals 
with emergencies involving danger to life or property if that 
request, command or order relates to the safety of any person 
or protection of any property in the vicinity of an emergency." 
Note that, as with TD AS 11.56.720, the person must unreasonably 
disobey the order. A refusal to obey an order which exposes 
a person to a substantial risk of injury would not, for example, 
constitute a violation of the statute. 
The statute upon which the proposed provivion is 
based, HAW. REV. STAT. § 710--10.12, is liI".liteo. to re;fusals to 
assist in fire control. TD AS 11.56.730 goes beyond the 
Hawaii statute by including not only that situation, but 
also the refusal to assist a member of any "public or private 
organization which deals with emergencies involving danger 
to life or property, " a term broad enough to cover such groups 
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as emergency medical service technician teams, ambulance 
attendants and the national guard. Given the similarity and 
importance of the interests to be protected, there is no reason 
to distinguish assistance in fire control from assistance during 
other emergencies such. as an avalanche or a flood. The 
Code provision also takes into account the special concerns 
involved in Alaska where "public" organizations may be too 
remote to render effective emergency aid. 
IV. TD AS 11.56.740. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR EMERGENCY AID 
This provision extends the "good sarnaritan" pro­
tections provided in AS 09.65.090 to situations where a 
citizen aids a person pursuant to TD AS 11.56.720 or .730. 
Not holding the citizen liable for ordinary negligence when 
he aids a person pursuant to either of the two preceeding 
statutes is both fair and necessary. As noted in the Commentary 
to the Hawaii Penal Code 
The waiver is fair in that it is hardly equi­
table to order a person to perform a useful 
act, on one hand, then expose him to the threat 
of civil liability, on the other. The waiver 
is necessary in that it would arguably be 
unreasonable to request such aid in many cases 
if all of the standards of civil liability were 
to apply. The person of whom aid is asked 
might, therefore, be able justifiably to refuse 
to give it. 
HN,J. REV. STAT. § 710-1012, Commentary at 242 l�pecial PaI!lphlet 
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V. TD AS 11.56.770, .780. HINDERING PROSECUTION IN THE 
FIRST AND SECOND DEGREES 
A. Existing Law 
While AS 12.15.010 has abolished the distinction 
between accessories before the fact and principals, the 
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distinction between accessories after the fact and principals 
still exists. Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923, 928 (Alaska 1973). 
AS 12.15.020 provides that persons who "after the commission 
of any felony, conceal or aid the offender with knowledge that 
he has committed a felony and with intent that he may avoid 
or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment 
are accessories. There are no accessories in misdemeanors." 
AS 11.10. 050 provides for one - five years imprisonment or 
$100 - $500 fine for an ascessory after the fact. 
B. The Code Provision 
Conduct which would give rise to liability as an 
accessory after the fact under existing law is classified as 
the crime of hindering prosecution under the Revised Code. 
By creating two degrees of hindering prosecution, the Revised 
Code changes the punishment applicable to accessories after 
the fact. The particular degree of the offense of "hindering 
prosecution" is geared to the class of the underlying crime 
committed by the fugitive. 
To commit either degree of hindering prosecution, 
the defendant must act with an "intent to hinder the appre­
hension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another " or 
to assist a person "in profiting or benefiting from the commission 
of the crime." The first degree offense, TD AS 11.56.770, a 
class C felony, requires that a felony be committed by the 
person aided and that the defendant be at least reckless as to 
whether that person has engaged in conduct constituting a felony. 
Note that while the statute requires that the person aided 
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actually have committed a felony, there is no requirement 
that the defendant be aware of the legal classification of the 
conduct. It is not a defense, for example, that the defendant 
did not know that second degree assault constituted a felony 
so long as he was at least reckless as to whether the person 
he aided intentionally caused physical injury to another by 
means of a dangerous instrument, a form of second degree assault. 
Hindering prosecution in the second degree would 
expand existing law by applying to the person who renders 
assistance to a person who has committed a class A misdemeanor. 
It should be noted that while the defendant is strictly liable 
regarding the nature of the criminal conduct, he must never­
theless have an "intent to hinder" prosecution. Commentary 
to the Model Penal Code notes that 
[TD AS 11.56.780) makes it an offense to aid 
misdemeanants as well as felons. This follows 
from our purpose to deter obstruction of justice. 
One can add to the difficulties of the police just 
as much where they are pursuing a misdemeanant as 
where they are after a felon. Furthermore, there 
are situations where the aider does not know what 
crime the putative offender may have committed, 
as where an unscrupulous surgeon agrees to change 
the appearance of a fugitive without caring to 
know the nature of his offense. In any event, it 
seems undesirable to introduce into prosecutions 
of this sort an issue of law (and defendant's 
knowledge thereof) as to the classification of 
the primary offense. 
110DEL PENAL CODE f) 20.8 . 32, Cornrnent.a:ry a.t 19'6 (Tent" Draft 9 1 1959.} 
Unlike existing law, the Code establishes the precise 
acts needed to commit either deqree of hinderinq prosecution. 
The six methods set forth in TD AS ll.56.770(b) present a 
narrower concept of aid than in common la�". This difference 
is discussed in the Commentary to the �l[odel Penal Code. 
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At common law the accessory after the fact was 
one who "receives, relieves, comforts, or assists" 
the felon. 
The issue of policy is whether to forbid 
specific kinds of aid or aid of any character 
whatsoever, That there may be need to limit the kinds 
of aid which will be made criminal appears when we 
consider the possible application of the Section to a 
person who merely refuses to answer police questions 
about the fugitive, or gives misleading answers, or 
advi.ses the fugitive to flee, or counsels h.im as to 
likely refuges or the law of extradition, or supplies 
bail. Although assistance of this character would 
appear to fall within the ordinary meaning of the 
term "aid", used in may statutes, the courts have shown 
a reluctance to extend the law so far. [On the theory] 
that the community does not desirP. prosP-:--ution in 
these situations, it would seem preferable not to use 
the comprehensive term "aid", but to specify the 
prohibited forms of aid, as [TD AS 11.56.7 70(�)] does. 
Among the activities specifically brought within 
the scope of [TD AS ll.56. 7 70(b)], we list first the 
traditional offense of harboring or concealing the 
fugitive, which requires proof that he was hidden or 
secreted by the actor. Efforts to conceal the com­
mission of the crime, or to alter, destroy, or hide 
evidence are and ought to be covered. Warning the 
principal of imminent discovery or apprehension is 
lik.ewi.se an unequivocal intervention against law 
enforcement. 
One form of assistance to the putative offender 
that deserves special consideration is money. Pro­
viding a fugitive with funds is an act of equivocal 
significance. He may use it to escape or hide, to 
pay debts or go into business, or to support himself 
or his dependents, or to hire a lawyer 1Subsection (3)] 
is intended to require proof that money was furnished 
not merely pursuant to a general desire to promote the 
offender's plan to remain at large, but specifically 
to facilitate escape efforts. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 208. 32, Commentary at 198-20.0 (Tent. Draft 
No • 9 , 19 5 9 ) • 
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VI TD AS 11. 56. 790. COMPOUNDING 
A. Existing Law 
The common law offense of compounding prohibited 
agreements for consideration to refrain from giving informa­
tion to law enforcement authorities concerning a crime. 
Alaska has retained the offense of compounding in AS 11.30.190. 
The statute applies to compounding both misdemeanors and 
felonies. If the crime compounded is punishable by life impri-
sonment, the punishment for compounding is imprisonment for 
1 - 5 years. The compounding of any other crime is punishable 
by 3 months - one year imprisonment or $50 - $500 fine. 
The existing statute defines compounding as the 
acceptance of any "gift, gratuity, valuable consideration or 
other thing or a promise of one of them, or a promise to do 
or cause to be done an act beneficial" upon an "understanding 
or agreement, expressed or implied, to compound or conceal 
the crime, or not to prosecute or give evidence of it." 
The person who receives the conside.rati.on commits compounding; 
the person who pays the consideration does not. 
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that certain 
misdemeanors may be compromised, AS 12.45.120, pursuant to 
an order of the court, AS 12.45.130. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Revised Code expands existing law by providing 
that both the receiver and the giver of the consideration commit 
compounding, a class A misdemeanor. The Subcomrnission viewed 
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both parties as being equally culpable and decided that iden­
tical punishments should apply to each. The Code defines the 
prohibited consideration as a "benefit, " a term defined and 
discussed in Tentative Draft, Part 2, Commentary at 87-89. 
The benefit must be offered or accepted in consideration for 
concealing the offense, refraining from initiating or aiding 
in the prosecution of the offense or withholding evidence of 
the offense. 
Note that the Code provision specifically recog­
nizes that existing law allows compromise of actions in 
certain situations. If the offer or acceptance of the benefit 
is made pursuant to these statutes, the participants have not 
committed compounding. 
VII. TD AS 11.56.800, .810. MAKING A FALSE REPORT, HAKING 
A FALSE BOMB REPORT 
A. Existing Law 
Currently, AS 11.30. 215 provides that a person who 
"wilfully and knowingly makes, or causes another to make, a 
false report of an alleged criminal offense to a peace officer 
or law-enforcement agency" commits the crime of "making a 
false report to a peace officer" punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than one ·year and/or a fine not exceeding $1, 000. 
False alarms to fire fighting authorities or 
ambulance service operators are prohibited in AS 11.45.050 
which carries the same punishment as AS 11.30.215. A person 
who "makes a false report, with the intent to deceive, 
mislead or otherwise misinform a person concerning the placing, 
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planting or discharging of a bomb or other explosive or 
incendiary device" com its the crime of "false reports of 
bombing" carrying a one to five year sentence and/or a maximum 
$5, 000 fine. AS 11.45.055. 
B. The Code Provisions 
Consistent with existing law, the Revised Code 
distinguishes between false reports in general and false 
bomb reports, providing more severe penalties for the latter. 
The making of a "false report " is a class A misdemeanor; the 
making of a "false bomb report'' is a class C felony. 
The crime of making a false report, TD AS 11.56.800, 
is based on existing AS 1 1.30.215 and AS 11.45.050. The 
proposed statute covers two types of false reports. Sub­
section (a) (1) covers the conduct of giving false information 
to a peace officer which the defendant knows to be false, 
with intent to implicate another in a crime. The Code 
provision limits the coverage of existing law by requiring 
that the defendant act with intent to implicate another in 
a crime. However, false reports to peace officers made with 
an intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction 
or punishment of another are prohibited in the two degrees of 
hindering prosecution (see TD AS ll.56.770(b) (4) supra). 
Subsection (a) (2) extends beyond the present "false 
alarms" statute in its application to fictitious reports of 
"other incidents calling for an emergency response" rather 
than solely false reports to firefighters or ambulance 
operators. This assures coverage of reports concerning 
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matters that may not be crimes in themselves, but are never­
theless within a proper area of investigation. A false 
report of a drowning, for example, results in the misappli­
cation of crucial emergency services creating the risk that 
such services will be unavailable to respond to real emergencies. 
Such conduct is prohibited in the Revised Code. 
Consistent with existing law, the Revised Code 
requires that the defendant know that his report is false. 
The Code also corresponds to existing law by requiring only 
that a fictitious report be given; no reliance is necessary. 
A person who knowingly makes a fictitious report can be 
assumed to intend to mislead the recipients in the performance 
of their duties. 
TD AS 1 1.56.810, an aggravated form of making a 
false report, covers the situation where a person knowingly 
makes a false report that a bomb or similar device is in a 
position to create a risk of harm. Unlike the existing 
statute, there is no requirement that the person "intend to 
deceive, mislead or otherwise misinform a person." The 
making of a known false report will be sufficient to con­
stitute a violation of the statute. 
The phrases "or causes to be given " and "or causes 
to be made" are included in the proposed statutes to insure 
coverage when the defendant causes another to make the false 
report. For example, if Steve makes a false report that a 
bomb is placed in a department store to John, the manager of 
the store, who in turn notifies the police, Steve has 
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violated TD AS 11.56.810 since he has caused the making 
of the false report to the police. 
VIII.TD AS 11.56.820. TAMPERING WITH PUBLIC RECORDS 
A. Existing Law 
At least five statutes in existing law prohibit 
various forms of altering, destroying, concealing, making 
false entries in or suppressing the availability of public 
records. The statutes differ as to what types of documents 
are protected, the manner in which the tampering occurs, 
the person doing the act, the culpable mental state required, 
and the sentences authorized. 
"Mishandling of public records, " AS 11.30.240, 
prohibits a person from wilfully destroying, secreting or 
mutilating a public record, book, paper or writing. The 
statute also prohibits a person from wrongfully taking 
any of the same items fro.m the person having legal custody 
of them, as well as.punishing a person who wrongfully 
obtains possession and refuses or neglects to return the 
document when lawfully required or demanded to do so. Punish­
ment is set at imprisonment from 90. days to one year. 
AS 11.30.245, "Obstruction of access to public records, " 
prohibits the intentional obstruction of inspection of a 
public record subject to inspection pursuant to AS 09.25.110 
or 09.25.120. Punishment for a first offense is by fine of 
$100 - $500. Second and subsequent violations may result 
in a one to six month sentence of imprisonment and/or $250 -
$1, 000 fine. 
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AS 11. 30.250, "Act of officer having custody " 
prohibits an officer having custody of a "record, map or 
book, or a paper or proceedi�g of a court, filed or deposited 
in a public office or placed in his hands for any purpose" 
from "stealing, wilfully destroying, mutilating, defacing, 
altering or falsifying, removing or secreting" the document 
or permitting another person to do so. Punishment is set 
at one - five years imprisonment and/or a $5, 000 fine. If 
AS 11.30.250 is violated by a person other than an "officer 
having custody, " AS 11.30.260 sets punishment at one - three 
years imprisonment and/or a $2, 000 fine. AS 11.30.280 prohibits 
false statements in a certificate or writing knowingly made 
by a public officer authorized to make or give the certificate 
or writing. Punishment is set at one - two years imprisonment 
and/or a maximum $5, 000 fine. 
B. The Code Provision 
The crime of tampering with public records, a class A 
misdemeanor, is intended to penalize conduct which undermines 
confidence in the accuracy of public records, confidence that 
is essential to efficient public administration. The central 
purpose of the proposed statute is not the protection of potential 
victims of altered public records. Consequently, TD AS 11.56.280 
does not require that the tampering be made with an intent to 
defraud as do the sections on forgery (see TD AS 11.46.500 -
.580) and falsification of business records (TD AS 11.46.630) . 
Further, there is no requirement that the information in the 
public record be made under oath or sworn to, as required 
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by the sections on perjury and related offenses. See TD 
AS 1 1.56.200-.240, Perjury and Related Offenses. The offenses 
of forgery and perjury do, however, complement the crime 
of tampering with public records when the aggravating cir­
cumstances are present. 
Key to the statute is the definition of public 
record appearing in TD AS 11.56.900(6). The definition is 
taken from SSHB 531, the Proposed Alaska Freedom of Information 
Act. The definition is broad enough to cover any article 
"regardless of physical form or characteristic, developed 
or received under law or in connection with the transaction 
of official business and preserved or appropriate for 
preservation by an agency . . . because of the information 
value in it." 
Two categories of conduct are prohibited. Subsection 
(a) (1) covers false entries or the false altering of a public 
record. Subsection (a) (2) covers the problem of access to 
public records. Included in this category are acts of destruc-
tion and mutilation as well as the suppression or concealment 
of a public record. This subsection is broad enough to cover 
the situation where a public servant prevents access to public 
records, conduct now described in AS 11. 30.245. 
Both subsections require that the defendant act 
knowingly. Under subsection (a) (1) he must know he is making 
a false entry or alteration. Under subsection (a} (2} he must 
destroy, mutilate or conceal documents, knowing that he has 
no legal authority to do so. 
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IX. TD AS 11.56.830. IMPERSONATING A PUBLIC SERVANT 
A. Existing Law 
AS 11.30.220 provides that a person who "falsely 
assumes to be a judge, magistrate or peace officer, and acts 
as such, and requires a person to aid or assist him in any 
matter pertaining to th.e duty of a judge, magistrate or 
peace officer" commits the crime of "impersonating a peace 
officer, " punishable by three months to one year imprison­
ment or $50 - $500 fine. 
B. The Code Provision 
The Code expands the existing statute by prohibiting 
the impersonation of any public servant (a term defined and 
discussed in Tentative Draft, Part 2, Commentary at 87, 92-93) , 
not merely peace officers. Impersonating a public servant is 
classified as a B misdemeanor. The defendant must falsely 
pretend to be a public servant and, as under the existing pro� 
vision, must do an act in that capacity. Note that subsection 
(b) (2) specifically excludes as a defense that the defendant 
was a public servant if he falsely represents himself to be 
another public servant. 
The existing requirement that the impersonator 
require another to aid or assist him is not retained in the 
Revised Code. Thus, the Code insures coverage in situations 
where no specific aid is requested, but the defendant has acted 
improperly. For example, a person who falsely pretends to be 
a housing inspector and obtains entrance to an apartment has 
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violated the statute. The requirement that an act be per­
formed in the capacity of the public servant insures that 
innocent impersonations, such as wearing a judge's robes to 
a costume ball, are not covered by the statute. 
Subsection {b) (1) rejects any possible defense based 
upon none.xistence of the office the impersonator pretended 
to hold. 
The Code does not retain the existing statute, 
AS 11. 20.500, which prohibits the unauthorized use of a badge 
or emblem of certain societies, e. g., Spanish war veterans 
and Greek letter fraternities. If the wearing of the emblem 
is coupled with intent to commit theft or other fraudulent 
practices, chapter 41 of the Revised Code will adequately 
cover such conduct. Use of an emblem to obtain unauthorized 
admission to a private club would, for example, constitute 
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CHAPTER 56. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. 
ARTICLE 6. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Sec. 11.56.900. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter, unless the con-
4 text requires otherwise, 
5 
6 witness to 
7 
(1) "improperly influence a witness" means to cause or induce a 
(A) testify falsely, offer misleading testimony, or withhold 
8 testimony· in an offi'ci'al :procee-ding; 
9 (B) avoid or attempt to avoid legal process summoning him to 
10 testify in an official proceeding, regardless of whether legal process has 
11 issued; 
12 (C) absent himself from an official proceeding to which he 
13 has been summoned; or 
14 
15 
(D) engage in conduct described in sec. 610 of this chapter; 
(2) "judicial officer" means a supreme court justice, including 
16 the chief justice, a judge of the superior court, a district court judge, or 
17 a magistrate; 
lb (3) "juror" means a person who is a member of an impanelled jury 
19 or a person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror; 
20 (4) "official proceeding" means a proceeding heard before a legis-
21 lative, judicial, administrative or other governmental body or official auth-
22 orized to hear evidence under oath; 
23 
(5) "physical evidence" means an article, object, document, record, 
24 or other thing of physic�l substance; 
25 (6) "public record" means a document, paper, book, letter, drawing, 
26 map, plat, photo, photographic file, motion picture, film, microfilm, micro-
27 photograph, exhibit, magnetic or paper tape, punched card or other document 
28 
of any other material, rc,gardless of physical form or characteristic, devel-
29 
oped or received under law or in connection with the transaction of official 
90. 
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business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by an agency, munici-
2 pality, or any body subject to the open meeting provision of AS 44.62. 310, as 
3 evidence of the organization, function, policies, decisions, procedures, 
4 operations or other activities of the state or municipality or because of the 
5 informational value in it; it also includes staff manuals and instructions to 
6 staff that affect the public; 
7 (7) "testimony" means oral or written statements, documents or 
8 other material that may be offered by a witness in an official proceeding; 























(A) a witness summoned or appearing in an official proceeding 
(B) a person whom the defendant believes may be called as a 





































CHAPTER 66. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND DECENCY. 
ARTICLE 1. PROSTITUTION AND RELATED OFFENSES. 
ECTION 
100 Prostitution 
llO Solicitation for Purposes of Prostitution 
120 Promoting Prostitution in the First Degree 
130 Promoting Prostitution in the Second Degree 
140 Compelling Prostitution in the First Degree 
150 Compelling Prostitution in the Second Degree 
160 Evidence Required for Secs. 120-150 of this Chapter 
170 Spouse as Witness 
180 Definitions 
Sec. 11. 66. 100. PROSTITUTION. (a) A person conrrnits the crime of 
rostitution if he 
(1) engages or agrees to engage in sexual conduct for hire; or 
(2) hires a person to engage in sexual conduct. 
(b) Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11. 66.110. SOLICITATION FOR PURPOSES OF PROSTITUTION. (a) A 
erson commits the crime of solicitation for purposes of prostitution if he 
olicits another person to engage in an act of prostitution. 
(b) Solicitation for purposes of prostitution is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.66. 120. PROMOTING PROSTITUTION IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A 
erson commits the crime of promoting prostitution in the first degree if, 
ith intent to promote prustitution, 
(1) he owns, controls, manages, supervises or otherwise maintains 
place of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise; 
(2) he, other than as a person being compensated for personally 
endered sexual conduct for hire or his patron, induces or causes a person 
o engage in prostitution or to remain in a place of prostitution; t
1
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(3) he receives or agrees to receive money or other property, 
2 ther than as a person being compensated for personally rendered sexual 
3 onduct for hire, pursuant to an agreement or understanding that the money or 

























(4) he engages in conduct that institutes, aids or facilitates a 
restitution enterprise. 
(b) Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11. 66. 130. PROMOTING PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A 
erson commits the crime of promoting prostitution in the second degree if he 
ngages in conduct, other than as a person being compensated for personally 
endered sexual conduct for hire or his patron, that aids or facilitates an 
ct of prostitution. 
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(b) Promoting prostitution in the second degree is a class B misdemean-
Sec. 11.66. 140. COMPELLING PROSTITUTION IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A 
erson commits the crime of compelling prostitution in the first degree if he 
(1) uses or threatens to use physical force on anyone with intent 
to induce or cause a person to engage in prostitution; 
(2) induces or causes a person less than 16 years of age to engage 
n sexual conduct for hire; or 
(3) induces or causes a person in his legal custody to engage in 
rostitution. 
(b) Compelling prostitution in the first degree is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11.66. 150. COMJ:'ELLING PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A 
erson commits the crime of compelling prostitution in the second degree if 
1e induces or causes a person at least 16 years of age but less than 19 years 
f age to engage in sexual conduct for hire. 
(b) Compelling prostitution in the second degree is a class C felony. 
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Sec. 11. 66. 160. EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR SECS. 120 - 150 OF THIS CHAPTER. 
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In a prosecution under secs. 120 - 150 of this chapter it is not necessary 
2 that the testimony of the person whose prostitution is alleged to have been 
3 compelled or promoted be corroborated by the testimony of any other witness 
r by documentary or other types of evidence. 4 
5 Sec. 11.66.170. SPOUSE AS WITNESS, In a prosecution under secs. 120 -
6 150 of this chapter spouses are competent and compellable witnesses for or 
7 against either party. 
8 Sec. 11.66.180. DEFINITIONS. As used in secs. 110 - 170 of this 
9 chapter, unless the context requires otherwise, 
10 (1) "place of prostitution" means any place where sexual conduct 
11 is engaged in for hire; 
12 (2) "prostitution enterprise" means an arrangement in which two or 


















(3) "sexual conduct" means genital or anal intercourse, cunni­
fellatio or masturbation of one person by another person. 
94. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 66 - Offenses Against Health and Decency 
ARTICLE 1. PROS'l'ITUTION AND RELA'rED OFFENSES 
CO.M.,.l\1ENT ARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code provisions on the Existing 
Law of Prostitution and Related Offenses 
In defining the crimes of prostitution, solicitation 
for purposes of prostitution, promoting prostitution and com­
pelling prostitution, the Prostitution and Related Offenses 
Article: 
1. Establishes six subs tan ti ve of fens es, th.us 
consolidating the twenty-four archaic statutes 
in existing law and redefining offenses such as 
keeping a bawdyhouse in madern terminology. 
2. Defines prostitution as sex neutral conduct, thus 
overcoming probable constitutional problems in the 
existing definition of the offense. 
3. Specifically lists the types of sexual acts asso­
ciated with prostitution, effectively broadening 
the range of conduct covered by the article. 
4. Creates two degrees of promoting prostitution, one 
a felony and one a misdemeanor, distinguished by 
the defendant's intent and the circumstances 
surrounding his conduct. 
5. Creates two degrees of compelling prostitution, both 
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felonies, distinguished by the existence of force, 
the relationship between defendant and the victim, 
and the age of the victim. 
6. Eliminates the corroboration requirement of AS 12. 
45.040, as interpreted in Johnson v. State, 50 1 P.2d 762 
(Alaska 1972) , to permit conviction of a defendant on 
the basis of uncorroborated testimony of a person 
whose prostitution was compelled or promoted. 
A closely divided Subcornmission voted to continue 
the application of criminal sanctions to the single act of 
prostitution not conducted in the context of organized 
activity. 
In support of decriminalization, a number of the 
members of the Subcornmission were of the opinion that any 
statute prohibiting private consensual sexual activity between 
adults might be subject to constitutional attack in light of 
the Alaska Supreme Court's holding in Ravin v .  State, 537 P.2d 
494, 504 (Alaska 1975), that " . .  citizens of the State of 
Alaska have a basic right to privacy in their houses under 
Alaska ' s  Constitution. '' On two occasions - Harris v. State, 
457 P.2d . 638 (Alaska 1969) and Anderson v. State, 567 P.2d 351 
(Alaska 197 7) - the Court has suggested that the right to 
privacy might protect certain sexual practices engaged in by 
consenting adults in private. 
Additionally, those in favor of decriminalization 
of the act of prostitution expressed the view that (1) the 
96. 
conduct involved was of such a nature that the continued 
imposition of criminal penalties would not likely result in 
any real deterrence; (2) that placing the prostitute outside 
the law might encourage involvement in other criminal activi­
ties; (3) that prostitution had persisted throughout the ages 
despite the best efforts of society to suppress it; and (4) 
that the scarce resources of the criminal justice system could 
be better used in dealing with offenses which were more harm­
ful to society. 
Those members of the Subcommission who favored 
continuation of criminal penalties for the single act of 
prostitution expressed the opinion that (1) many members of 
society still viewed the act as a crime; (2) that there were 
a variety of "spin-off" offenses of a more serious nature 
which stemmed from prostitution and that those offenses could 
be better controlled through the continued imposition of 
criminal sanctions for prostitution ; and (3) that legali-
zation of th.e single act when coupled with the continued 
criminalization of related offenses would create a situa­
tion fraught with inconsistency and present serious problems 
in the enforcement of laws governing conduct related to 
prostitution. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11. 66.180. DEFINITIONS 
Three terms are defined to provide clarity through­
out the sections dealing with prohibited prostitution activity. 
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It should be noted that the term "person " is not 
defined in the prostitution and related offenses article. 
Instead, it is defined with the other general definitions which 
apply throughout the Revised Code. That definition includes 
all natural persons. Consequently, the offenses defined in 
this article are "sexless" ones and may be committed by a 
male or female acting as either a prostitute or patron. The 
use of masculine pronouns throughout the article is merely for 
drafting convenience and is not intended in any way to detract 
from the Revised Code ' s  sex-neutral approach to prostitution 
and related offenses. 
A. Subsection (1) Place of Prostitution. 
The use of this term is designed to insure that 
criminal sanctions can be applied to individuals who use 
physical locations other than houses or apartments, such as 
boats, trailers or vans, for prostitution activities. The 
activity, not its location, will be the determining factor 
in whether the provisions of the article are to be applied. 
B. Subsection (2). Prostitution Enterprise. 
This term has been used to permit appropriate penalty 
distinctions to be made between the socially harmful conduct 
related to the promotion of prostitution as a business and 
a variety of less serious and frequently innocuous conduct 
which merely facilitates prostitution. The drafted definition 
is designed to reach, for example, agreements between a prosti­
tute and a pimp, between two prostitutes, or larger scale 
activities. By the use of the term "organized", however, it 
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is not intended to reach a transaction involving a prostitute 
and a patron. 
c .  Subsection (3) .  Sexual Conduct. 
This term is used to insure that prostitution is 
not limited to heterosexual genital intercourse, which, arguably, 
is the only sexual conduct covered by the existing AS 11.40.210. 
By broadening the range of conduct covered by the provisions of 
the article, the definition takes into account the realities 
of commerce in sexual services . Additionally, the term, as 
defined, is designed to complement the sex-neutral definition 
of prostitution contained in the Revised Code. 
II. TD AS 1 1. 66 .100. PROSTITUTI01J 
This section describes the underlying offense of 
this chapter and makes it a class B misdemeanor. I t  covers 
a broader scope of consensual commercial sexual activity 
than existing law, recognizing that sexual intercourse, alone, 
is not the only form of service provided by prostitutes and 
that the activity may be either heterosexual or homosexual 
in nature. 
The commercial character of the prohibited conduct 
is fixed by the use of the term "for hire" . As with. existing 
law, cash consideration is not required. 
As drafted, the section covers the activities of 
both the prostitute and the patron. The offense may be 
9 9 .  
committed by either engaging or agreeing to engage in sexual 
conduct for hire (the prostitute), or by hiring a person to 
engage in sexual conduct (the patron) . 
III. TD AS 11.66.110. SOLICITATION FOR PURPOSES OF PROSTITUTION 
This section makes it a class A misdemeanor to solicit 
a person to engage in prostitution. It is designed primarily 
to deal with street solicitations, a form of conduct the Sub­
commission deemed particularly annoying. to the public. However, 
as drafted, it covers any solicitation for purposes of prosti­
tution made in any place, public or private. 
IV. TD AS 11.66.120. PROMOTING PROSTITUTION IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE. 
This section imposes class C felony penalties on 
the more serious business aspects of prostitution. In so 
doing, it combines in a single statute fourteen existing 
statutory provisions. As drafted, it is designed to prohibit 
such conduct as the running of a house of prostitution or 
pimping. 
The conduct prohibited in this section must be 
engaged in with the specific intent to promote prostitution. 
The section is not intended to cover, for example, the innocent 
landlord who unintentionally or unknowingly rents to prostitutes. 
Further, even if a landlord knowingly rents to a prostitute, 
he could not be held liable unless he acted with the intent to 
promote prostitution. 
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Paragraph (1) covers both fixed situs and "call 
girl" types of prostitution activity. Paragraph (2) is aimed 
at the panderer or pimp. It is not intended, however, to 
cover a prostitute who induces a patron to remain in a place 
of prostitution for purposes of engaging in an act of sexual 
conduct. However, it would cover the prostitute who caused 
or induced a person other than a patron to engage in prostitu­
tion. Paragraph (3) is directed at the person who knowingly 
derives a profit from prostitution. It is somewhat more 
restrictive than traditional "living off the earnings" 
statutes. Prostitution statutes have been unique in attaching 
criminal liability to one who is supported by the illegal 
income of another, and there seems to be little justification 
for continuing such a legislative policy. Such statutes have 
the effect of prohibiting a person engaged in prostitution from 
establishing a "normal" social relationship with an unemployed 
individual. 
Paragraph (4) is intended to reach conduct which 
enables prostitution activities to occur such as the procuring 
of either prostitutes or their patrons or the transportation 
of prostitutes. It bears repeating that the conduct must 
be engaged in with the intent to promote prostitution. This 
paragraph would not reach the conduct of a cab driver who 
drove a person to a place of prostitution not knowing it to 
be such; or, knowing it to be such but not acting with the 
intent to promote prostitution. 
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Neither paragraph (4) nor paragraph (2), is intended 
to reach the conduct of a patron who hires two prostitutes at 
once. Such an individual would be covered by the provisions 
of TD AS 11. 66. 110 if the conduct merely involved a solicita­
tion, or by the provisions of TD AS 11. 66. 110 if the conduct 
involved the hiring of prostitutes to engage in sexual conduct. 
V. TD AS 11. 66 . 130. PROMOTING PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND
DEGREE 
The primary distinction between this section and 
TD.AS ll.66. 120 (a) (4) is that this section is limited to 
facilitation of a single "act" of prostitution while the fi.:(st 
degree provision applies to intentional acts promoting prostitu­
tion enterprise. Further, a specific promotional intent is 
not required for violation of the second degree provision. 
A hotel employee who steers a guest at the hotel to a prosti­
tute in return for the expectation of a larger "tip" when the 
guest checks out has committed promoting prostitution in the 
second degree. The hotel employee may have no formal relation-
ship with the prostitute and may not receive any compensa-
tion from the prostitute for his activities. A cab driver who 
engages in similar conduct with respect to a "fare" for essen­
tially the same reasons as the hotel employee is also covered. 
Because culpability is not specified, the general rules regard­
ing culpability are applicable. The defendant must knowingly 
engage in conduct and be at least reckless as to whether his 
conduct is facilitating prostitution. See Tentative Draft, 
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Part 2, Commentary at 21. 
VI. TD AS 11. 66.140. COMPELLING PROSTITUTION IN THE FIRST
DEGREE 
This section, a class B felony, is designed to deal 
with coercive aspects that may be involved in prostitution. 
Paragraph (a) (1) is designed to impose liability 
in the case of physical coercion to cause someone to engage 
in prostitution. 
Paragraph (a) (2) is intended to insure that, regard­
less of consent, the young receive the protection from 
society that their age, social and intellectual development 
demands·. At the time of the drafting of this commentary the 
Subcommission was considering, but had reached no decision, 
on whether to permit reasonable mistake of age as an affirmative 
defense to this section. 
Paragraph (a) (3) is designed to reach individuals 
who may induce children, foster children, incompetents, or 
others in their legal custody to engage in prostitution. 
VII. TD AS 11. 66. 150. COMPELLING PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND
DEGREE
The intent of this section is essentially the same 
as that underlying TD AS 11.66. 140. Here, however, lesser 
penalties are provided in cases in which the person who is 
induced or caused to engage in prostitution is at least 16, 
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but less than 19 years of age. The Subcommission is also 
considering whether to provide for the application of the 
affirmative defense or reasonable mistake of age to this 
section. 
VIII. TD AS 11. 66. 160. EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR SECTIONS
. 120 - . 150 OF THIS CHAPTER 
This section will reverse the effect of AS 12. 45.040, 
as interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court in Johnson v. State, 
501 P. 2d 762 (Alaska 1972). The existing statute requires 
corroboration of the testimony of a prostitute to insure that 
alleged ' victims" were not motivated by blackmail, malice or 
abnormal psychological conditions. As drafted, TD AS 11. 66. 160 
is consistent with the proposed provisions of the Code related 
to corroboration in perjury cases (see TD AS 11. 56. 220, 
Tentative Draft, Part 2, at 95) and to existing corroboration 
requirements in rape cases. 
IX. TD AS 11. 66. 170. SPOUSE AS WITNESS
This section recodifies provisions of existing law 
found in AS 11.40. 130 and is designed to insure that traditional 
evidentiary privileges will not forestall prosecution in 
appropriate cases. 
104.
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CHAPTER 66. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND DECENCY. 
ARTICLE 2. GA11BLING OFFENSES. 
Section . · 
200 Gambling 
210 Promoting Gambling .in the First Degree 
220 Promoting Gambling in the Second Degree 
230 Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree 
2,.0 Possession of G,-mbling Records in the Second Degree 
250 Affirmative Defenses Applicable to Secs. 230-- and 240 
260 Possession of a Gambling Device 
270 Definitions 
Sec. 11.66.200. GAMBLING. (a) A person commits the offense of
gambling if he engages in unlawful gambling. 
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this
section that the defendant was a player in a social game. 
·(c) Gambling is a violation for the first offense. Gambling is a
class B misdemeanor for the second and each subsequent offense. 
Sec: 11. 66 .. 210. PROMOTING GAMBLING IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of promoting gambling in the first degree if he 
promotes or profits from an unlawful gambling enterprise. 
(b)
° 
.Promoting gambling in the first degree is a class C felony. 
Sec. 11.66.220. PROMOTING GAMBLING IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A
person commits the crime of promoting gambling in the second degree if 
he promotes or profits from unlawful gambling. 
(b) Promoting gambling in the second degree is a class A misde­
meanor. 
Sec. 11.66.230. POSSESSION OF GAMBLING RECORDS IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE. (a) A person commits th_e crime of possession of gambling 
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character, he possesses a writing or paper of a kind comnonly used in 
the operation or promotion of an unlawful zombling enterprise. 
. (b) Possession of gambling records in the first degree i.s a class 
· c f_clony.
Sec. 11.66.240. POSSESSION OF GAMBLING RECORDS IN THE SECOND 
DEGREE. (a) A person commits the crime of possession of gambling 
records in the se�ond degree if, with knowledge of its contents or 
character, he possesses a writine or paper of·a kind corrnnonly used in 
the operation or promotion of unlawful gambling. 
(b) Possession of gambling records i.n the second degree is a class
A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.66.250. AFFIRHATIVE DEFENSES APPLICABLE TO SECS. 230 AND 
240. (a) It is an affirmative defense in a prosecution under sec. 230
of this chapter that the writing or paper is possessed by the defendant
solely as a player.
or 
the 
(b) It is an affinnative defense in a prosecution under sec. 230
240 of this chapter that the writing or paper 
(1) is not used or intended to be used by the defendant in
operation or promotion of unlawful gambling; (2) is used or intended to be used by the defendant in a
social game. 
. .  Sec. 11. 66. 260. POSSESSION OF A GAMBLING DEVICE. (a) A person 
commits the offense of. possession of a gambling device if, with know­
ledge of the character of the device, he m�nufactures, sells, transports 
places or possesses, or conducts or negotiates a transaction affecting 
or designed to affect ownership, custody or use of 
(1) a gambling device other than a slot machine, with reck­
less disregard that the device is to be used in promoting unlawful 
gambling; or 
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(2) ·a slot machine.
(b) It is an affirmative defense in a prosecution under (a) (l) of
this section that the gambling device possessed by the defendant is used 
or _intended to be used only in a social game. 
(c) Possession of a gambling device is a violation.
Sec. 11.66.270. DEFINITIONS. As used in secs. 200 - 270 of this 
chapter, unless the context requires otherwise, 
(1) "contest of ·chance" means a contest, game, gaming scheme
or gaming device in which the outcome depends in a material degree upon 
an element of chance, notwithstanding that the skill of the contestants 
may also be a factor; 
(2) "gambling" means that a p�rson stakes or risks something
of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent 
event not under his control or influence, upon an agreement or under­
standing that he or someone else will receive something of value in the 
event of a certain outcome; "gambling" docs not include 
(A) bona fide business transactions valid under the law
of contracts for the purchase or sale at a future date of securi­
ties or comuoditics and agreements to compensate for loss caused by 
the happening of chance, including but not limited to contracts of 
indemnity or guaranty and life, health or accident insurance; or 
(B) playing an amusement device that
(i). confers only an innnediatc right of replay not
exchangeable for something of value other than the privilege 
of immediate repl�y; and 
(ii) does not contain a method or device by which
the privilege of innnediate replay may be cancelled or revoked; 
(3) "gambling device" means any device, machine, paraphe,r­
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unlawful gambling, whether it consists of gambling between per.sons or 
gambling by a person involving the playing of a machine; "gambling 
device" does not include 
(A) lottery tickets, policy slips, or oth�r items used
in the playing phases of lottery or policy schemes; or 
(B) an amusement device as described in (2) (B) of this
section; 
(4) "gambling enterprise" means a garnbline business which
(A) includes five or mo:i;e persons who _conduct, finance,
manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of the business; and 
(B) has been or remains in su�stantially continuous
operation for a period in excess of 30 days or has a gross income 
of $2,000 or more in any single day; 
(5) "player" means a person who engages in gambling solely as
a contestant or bettor, believing that the risk of losing and the 
chances of winning are the.same for all participants except for the 
advantages of skill and luck, without receiving or becoming entitled to 
. receive any profit from gambling other than personal gambling winnings 
and without otherwise rendering any material assistance to the estab­
lishment, conduct or bperation of the particular gambling activity, 
except that, for purposes of this definition, a person who gambles at a 
social game on equal terms with the other participants does not "other­
wise render material a.ssistance" to the establishment, conduct or opera­
tion by pe�forming, without fee or remunerrition, acts directed towards 
20A 
the arrangement or facilitation of the iame, such as inviting persons 
to play, permitting the use of premises for the game, or supplying cards 
or other equipment used in the game; "player" does not include a person 
who promotes gambling by unlawfully acceptin� bets from members of the 
public as a business, rather than in a casual or personal fashion, upon 
108.
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the outcomes of future contingent events; 
(6) "profits from gambline" means that a person, acting other
than as a player, accepts or receives money or other property under an 
·agreement or undcrs�anding with another person by which he participates
or is to participate. in the proceeds of gambling;
(7) "promoting gambling" means that a person, acting other
than as a player, engages in conduct that materially aids any form of 
gambling; conduct of this nature includes but is not limited to 
(A) conduct directed toward the
(i) creation or establishment of the particular
gambling activity or acquisition or maintenance of premises, 
paraphernalia, equipment or apparatus used in the gambling; 
(ii) conduct of the playing phases of gambling; or
_ (iii) arrangement of the financial or recording phase 
of gambling or toward any other phase of its operation; or 
(B) having·control or right of control over premises
that are used with the defendant's knowledge·for -purposes of gamb­
ling and permitting the gambling to occur or continue without 
iaking an effort to prevent its occurrence or continuation; 
(8) "slot machine" means a gambling device that, as a result of
the· insertion of a coin or other object, operates, either completely 
automatically or with the aid of some physical act by the player, in sue 
a manner that, dependi?g upon elements of chance: it may eject something 
of value or otherwise entitle the player to something of value; a device 
so conitructed or readily adaptable or convertible to such use is a slot 
machine even though 
'• . 
(A) it is not in working order;
(B) some mechanical act of manipulation or repair is
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· (c) apart from its use or adaptability as a slot machine
it may also sell or deliver something of value on some basis other 
than chance; 
(9) "social game" means gambling in a home whe.re no hous e
player, house bank, or house odds exist and where the.re is no house 
income from the operation of the game; 
(10) "something of value" means any money or property; any
token, object or article exchangeable for money or property; and any 
form of credit or promise directly or indirectly conte�plating transfer 
of money or property or of any interest in money or property or involv­
ing extension of a service, entertainment or a privilege of playing at 
a game or scheme without charge; 
(11) "unlawful" means not specifically authorized by law.
110.
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 66 - Offenses Against Public Health and Decency 
ARTICLE 2. GAMBLING OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
Article 2 of Chapter 66 of the Revised Code adopts 
a comprehensive pattern of gambling legislation similar to 
that proposed in Michigan and enacted in New York (N. Y. PENAL 
LAW, Art. 225), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1220 to 1231) 
and Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167. 117-162). The article 
initiates a comprehensive revision of Alaska's gambling laws. 
For the most part the coverage of existing law has been 
preserved although emphasis has been changed in several 
instances. The Code changes existing law in two significant 
ways. 
1. The Code excludes from the prohibitions of
the criminal· law the "friendly poker game" by recognizing 
an affirmative defense to gambling that the defendant engaged 
in gambling solely as a contestant or bettor in a home 
where no house income, other than personal winnings, resulted 
from the game. 
2. The Code focuses on organized crime by creating
a felony offense of promoting gambling which applies to the 
person who promotes or profits from an unlawful gambling 
enterprise. The term "gambling enterprise" is defined as a 
gambling business involving at least five persons which remains 
in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess 
of 30 days or has gross income of $2000 or more in any day. 
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I. Existing Law
"The essential elements of gambling are price, chance 
and prize. Thus, one gambles when he pays a price for a chance 
to obtain a prize. " State v. Pinball Machines; 404 P. 2d 923, 
925 (Alaska 1965) . Six statutes in existing law prohibit 
activity associated with gambling. 
The primary gambling offense is AS 11. 60.140, "Dealing 
or conducting a gambling game. " The statute provides that 
it is a misdemeanor for a person to deal, play, carry on, open 
or cause to be open, or conduct a game of "faro, monte, 
roulette . . .  poker . . .  or other game . . .  whether played for money . . .  
or other representative value." As the statute extends to 
"playing, " the prohibition covers the person who merely partic.,... 
ipates in a friendly poker qame at his own house. Gambling is 
punishable by "a fine of not more then $500 and by imprison-
ment in a jail until the fine and costs are paid. A person 
so convicted is punishable one day for every $2 of the fine 
and costs. The imprisonment shall not exceed one year. " 
Insofar as the statute makes jail time dependent on ability 
to pay a fine, the penalty for gambling is unconstitutional. 
See, Hood v. Snedly, 498 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1972). 
AS 11. 60. 170 provides penalties of 30 days to six 
months imprisonment and/or a $100 - $500 fine for a person who 
"maintains, aids or abets, or is associated in maintaining'' a 
place where gaming or gambling activities are carried on. 
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Such places are also declared to be nuisances and may be 
enjoined. AS 11. 60. 180. Gambling implements used in violation 
of the statutes may be seized and destroyed. AS 11.45. 040. 
See One Cocktail Glass v. State, No. 1437 (Alaska, June 8, 
1977) . 
Misdemeanor penalties are provided for promoting 
or setting up lotteries, AS 11. 60. 010 (imprisonment for 6 
months - 1 year in penitentiary or 3 months - 1 year in jail 
or $100 - $1000 fine) ; selling tickets or shares in a lottery, 
AS 11.60. 020 (imprisonment for 3 months - 1 year or $50 -
$500 fine) ; advertising lottery tickets, AS 11. 60. 030 (1 -
6 months or $20 - $200 fine) ; and selling fictitious lottery 
tickets, AS 11. 60. 040 (1 - 3 years imprisonment) . 
II. The Code Provisions
1. TD AS 11. 66. 270 (2) . Definition of "Gambling"
The definition of "gambling" is key to the comprehensive
treatment of gambling offenses in the Revised Code. The 
Code definition is based on that set forth in State v. Pinball 
Machines, 404 P. 2d 923, 925 (Alaska 1965) noted supra. In 
the Code, "'gambling' means that a person stakes or risks 
something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance 
or a future contingent event not under his control or influence 
upon an agreement or understanding that he or someone else 
will receive something of value in the event of a certain 
outcome. " The terms "contest of chance" and "something of 
value" are defined in TD AS 11.66. 270 (1) and (10) . 
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The definition of gambling includes any activity 
that brings a profit based on chance and includes ordinary 
lotteries. After broadly describing gambling, it is unnecessary 
to list gambling games by name as is done in the existing 
statutes. See AS 11. 60. 140. Games of pure skill, i. e. , 
chess, will not be considered gambling if the contestants bet 
against each other. Placing a side bet on a game of chess, 
however, would be gambling because, from the onlooker's 
perspective, the outcome depends on ''chance" as he has no 
control over the outcome. 
The exceptions to the definition of "gambling" 
in subsection (A) are necessary to exclude stock, 
commodity, and insurance transactions from the scope of the 
gambling definition. The exception in subsection (B) excludes 
from the definition of "gambling" playing a pinball machine 
that is able to "pay-off" only in free games. The provision 
changes existing law under which such machines have been 
held to be gambling implements subject to seizure. Pinball 
Machines v. State, 371 P. 2d 805 (Alaska 1962); State v. 
Pinball Machines, 404 P. 2d 932 (Alaska 1965) . Note, however, 
that any pinball machine that contains any method or device 
(commonly referred to as a "knock-off" button) whereby free 
games may be cancelled or revoked does not come under the 
exception. A machine that has such a device indicates the 
strong likelihood that "free games" are being exchanged for 
some other form of consideration. 
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2. TD AS 11. 66. 270 (1). Definition of "Contest of Chance"
In Morrow v. State, 511 P. 2d 127 (Alaska 1973) the
court considered the issue of whether a "football card" is 
a lottery. The cvurt adopted the "dominant factor" approach 
by holding that a "scheme constitutes a lottery where chance 
dominates the distribution of prizes even though such a 
distribution is affected to some degree by the exercise of 
skill or judgment. " The Code follows the approach taken by 
other revised codes, [see, e. g. , N. Y. PENAL LAW§ 225. 00 (1) ; 
OR. REV. STAT. § 167. 117 (1) ] in postulating a similar definition, 
but not adopting the "dominant factor" test. 
In many instances it will be virtually impossible 
to prove or determine whether chance or skill dominates. 
"It should be sufficient that, despite the importance of 
skill in any given game, the outcome depends in a material 
degree upon an element of chance. " N. Y. PENAL LAW§ 225. 00, 
Commentary at 23 (McKinney 1967). 
3. TD AS 11. 66. 200. Gambling
Subject to the "social game" affirmative defense,
the Code prohibits all forms of "unlawful gambling. " A 
first gambling offense is classified as a violation (a non­
criminal offense) . Second and subsequent convictions, 
however, are punishable as B misdemeanors. The definition 
of "unlawful" (TD AS 11. 66. 270 (11) ) recognizes that no 
gambling practice is lawful unless it is expressly authorized 
by statute. See generally, AS 05. 15 (Bingo, Raffles and Ice 
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Pools) . With regard to gambling authorized pursuant to 
Title 5, the Subcornrnission considered the necessity of revising 
the gambling provisions of that Title from the perspective 
of the criminal sanction. Legislative recommendations and 
a discussion of reasons for the proposals are found in 
Appendix II to this Tentative Draft. 
The affirmative defense in subsection (b) (which 
the defendant must raise and establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence) exempts "friendly games" and "friendly bets" 
from the coverage of TD AS 11. 66. 200. The defense requires 
that the defendant first establish that he is a player. 
"Player" is defined in TD AS 11. 66. 270 (5). That definition 
requires that the person engage in gambling solely as 
a contestant or bettor without receiving any profit from the 
gambling other than his winnings and without rendering 
material assistance to the gambling. Conduct directed toward 
the establishment of a social game is specifically excluded 
from the definition of "material assistance. " 
The equal risk and chance provision in the 
definition of "player" does not refer to the advantage enjoyed 
by a skilled player; it excludes the affirmative defense to 
those who cheat at otherwise social games. 
The affirmative defense also requires that the 
player establish that he participated in a "social game. " 
That term is defined in TD AS 11. 66.270(9) as "gambling in 
a home where no house player, house bank or house odds exist 
and where there is no house income from the operation of the 
game. " 
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If the house or banker has an advantage because of 
the way the game is conducted, the affirmative defense is 
denied to all participants since a social game requires that 
no "house player, house bank or house odds exist." For 
example, consider the case where Pat invites a few friends 
over to his house to play blackjack. If Pat remains the 
dealer throughout the game and, according to the rules of the 
game, wins in all instances of ties, house odds exist. The 
chances of winning are not the same for all participants. 
All participants have committed gambling since they have 
not met the requirements of the affirmative defense. 
Thus, under the Code, gambling in a home when no 
house income or house odds exist is not subject to criminal 
penalties. If the gambling occurs elsewhere, for example, 
in a park or in a bar, the affirmative defense is denied 
even though no house income or odds exist. 
4. TD AS 11. 66. 210 - . 220. Promoting Gambling in the
First and Second Degree
Sections 210 and 220 of the article provide broad
coverage of all forms of gambling exploitation. In doing so, 
these sections change existing law by providing felony penalties 
for the promoting of or profiting from large scale gambling 
enterprises. Both "profits from gambling" and "promoting 
gambling" are defined to exclude coverage of one who merely 
participates in gambling. Such a person, subject to 
the affirmative defense of "social games, " is covered by 
TD AS 11. 66. 200, Gambling. 
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TD AS 11.66.220 provides that it is a class A 
misdemeanor to engage in either of two forms of gambling 
activity. The first is " promoting" unlawful gambling. This 
term is defined in TD AS 11.66.270 (7) to include any activity 
that goes beyond being a player, including setting up the 
game, acquisition of the necessary equipment, bringing in 
the players, and financing the operation. Again, note that 
one who merely arranges for a social game is a " player" and 
does not fall within the coverage of either degree of promoting 
gambiing. 
The second activity prohibited is "profiting" from 
unlawful gambling. This term is defined in TD AS 11.66. 270 (6) 
and covers the receipt by persons other than players of money 
or other property as proceeds from gambling activity based on 
a prior agreement or understanding to that effect. 
TD AS 11.66.210 provides class C felony penalties 
for promoting or profiting from an unlawful gambling enter­
prise. The term "unlawful gambling enterprise" is defined 
in TD AS 11.66.270 and is taken directly from the federal 
gambling statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1955. A "gambling enterprise" 
is defined as a gambling business which includes five or more 
persons " who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, 
or own all or part of such business." Additionally, it must 
be established that the gambling business " has been or remains 
in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess 
of 30 days or has a gross income of $2, 000 or more in any 
single day. " 
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The definition is broad enough to extend to a 
business which operates in more than one premise. Because 
the definition of "gambling enterprise" is taken directly 
from federal law, it is expected that federal decisions 
interpreting 18 U. S. C. § 1955 will be highly relevant in the 
interpretation of the Code provisions. 
5. TD AS 11. 66. 230 - . 240. Possession of Gambling 
Records in the First and Second Degree 
TD AS 11. 66. 230 and . 240 prohibit the possession of 
any writing or paper of a kind commonly used in the operation 
or promotion of unlawful gambling. Both proposed statutes 
require that the defendant possess the writing or paper with 
knowledge of its contents or character. Playing cards are 
not gambling .records; they are covered by TD AS 11. 66. 350 
discussed infra. 
Division of the possession of gambling records 
offense into two degrees parallels the Code's treatment of 
the crime of promoting gambling by distinguishing between 
large and small scale operators. If the paper or writing is 
of a kind commonly used in the operation of an unlawful 
gambling enterprise (i. e. , records reflecting the operation 
of a large scale gambling business) the possessor has com­
mitted tpe first degree offense, a class C felony. Possession 
of other gambling records is a class A misdemeanor. 
In TD AS 11. 66. 250, the Code recognizes three 
affirmative defenses to the possession offenses. The first 
defense, applicable only to the first degree crime, is set 
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out in TD AS ll. 66. 250 (a) . Under subsection (a), a defendant 
who is able to establish by a preponderance of evidence that 
he holds "gambling records" merely in his capacity as a player 
cannot be convicted of the first degree offense. Subsection (a) 
is intended to preclude felony convictions in cases where 
the defendant is in possession of football cards or other 
tokens evidencing his own participation as a player in a 
gambling enterprise. Note that the affirmative defense applies 
only in a prosecution for the first degree offense; player 
status is no defense to prosecution under the second degree 
statute. 
The two remaining affirmative defenses contained 
in TD AS ll. 66. 250 (b) apply to both degrees of possession of 
gambling records. Subsection (b) (1) allows a defense when 
the defendant is able to establish that the paper or writing 
is not intended to be used in operation or promotion of 
unlawful gambling. Subsection (b) (2) recognizes as an affirma­
tive defense that the writing or paper is "used or intended 
to be used by the defendant in a social game" despite the 
fact that even "social games" are, by definition, unlawful 
gambling. Thus, the person who engages in a social game, 
as defined in TD AS 11. 66. 270 (9) , will not be penalized for 
keeping score sheets or other writings or papers commonly 
used during such games. 6. TD AS 11. 66. 260. Possession of a Gambling Device 
This section prohibits the unlawful possession of 
gambling devices and the possession of all slot machines. 
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Possession of a gambling device is a violation. (The device 
or slot machine will also be subject to forfeiture pursuant to 
an additional section of the gambling article to be completed 
by the Subcornrnission at the December 10, 1977 meeting. ) The 
term "gambling device, " is defined in TD AS 11. 66. 270 (3) as 
'' any device, machine, paraphernalia or equipment that is used 
or usable in the playing phases of unlawful gambling, " other 
than lottery tickets or policy slips (possession of which is 
punishable as possession of gambling records, TD AS 11. 66. 230, 
240). The definition of gambling device also specifically 
excludes pinball machines that only ''pay off" in free games. 
Possession of slot machines, defined in TD AS 11. 66. 270 (8), 
is prohibited in subsection (a) (2). 
The conduct prohibited by the statute includes the 
manufacture, sale, transporting, and possession of any gambling 
device or slot machine, or the conducting or negotiating of 
any transaction affecting or designed to affect ownership, 
custody or use of such items. When a gambling device other than 
a slot machine is involved, the prosecution must establish 
that the defendant acted with reckless disregard as to whether 
the device was to be used in the promotion of unlawful gambling. 
This culpable mental state requirement insures that a prima 
facie case of possession of a gambling device cannot rest on 
proof that the defendant possessed such otherwise innocuous 
items as chips or a deck of playing cards, which would otherwise 
be covered because of the broad definition of a gambling device. 
Note, however, that possession of slot machines is prohibited 
without regard to the culpability of the defendant. 
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APPENDIX I 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapters 31 , 46 (Articles 3 and 5), 56 (Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6) 
and 66 (Articles 1 and 2) 
DERIVATIONS 
CHAPTER 31 - A'l'TEMPT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
The Code ' s  provisions on conspiracy are based on 
ORS 161 � 450-. 485 . 
In applying cons:t)iracy to a li17ited number of crimes 
the Code follows the approach adopted in OHIO �EV. CODE A�N. 
§ 2923 . 01 .  
TD AS ll . 31. 120 (d) is based on PROPOSED FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CODE, STUDY DRAFT § 11)0 4 (6) (1970). 
TD AS ll . 31. 140 (e) l S  based on �o REV . STAT. § 564 . 
016 (�ffective Jan . 1, 1979) . 
CHAPTER 46 - OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
ARTICLE 3 - ARSON, CRPUNAL llHSCF!IEF AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11 . 46.480 - Criminal Mischief in the First Degree 
Suhsection (a) (1) is based on HN··7 .  REV . STAT . 
§ 708-826. 
Subsection (a )  ( 2 )  is based on BA�·7 . Rl".:V . S':r'Arr . 
§ 708-821 (a)_ . 
Subsection (a) (3) i s  based on AS ll. 20. 517 (a) . 
TD AS 11 . 46. 482 - Criminal Mischief in the Second 
Degree 
Subsection (a) (1) is bA.sed on HAlv . REV . S'J'AT. 
§ 708- 821 (b). 
Subsection (a) (2) is based on AS ll . 20. 517 (b). 
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Subsection (a) (3) is based on HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 708. 822 (a) .
822 ( b )
TD AS 11. 46. 484 - Criminal Mischief in the Third 
Degree 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-
TD AS 11. 4 6. 486 - Criminal Mischief in the Fourth 
Degree 
Subsection (a) (1) is based on HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 708-827 and AS 11. 20. 515.
Subsection (a) (2) is based on ORS 164. 354 (b). 
Subsection (a) ( 3 )  is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 70 8-
823. 
825 (1). 
TD AS 11. 46. 490 - Definitions 
Subsection (1) is based on AS 11.20. 635 (d) (1). 
Subsection ( 2) is based on HA.Iv. REV. STAT. § 70 8-
Subsection (3) is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 708.!.. 
825 (2). 
Subsection (4) is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-
800 (21) . 
ARTICLE 5 - BUSINESS AND COM.i'\1.ERCIAL OFFENSES 
TD AS 11. 46. 600-. 610 - Scheme to Defraud 
The two degrees of scheme to defraud are based on 
H . Y .  PENAL LA�,7 § §  190.. 6.0-- . 6.5 and 18 U. S. C. §. 1341. 
TD AS 11. 46. 620 - Misapplication of Property 
This section is based on ORS§ 165.095. 
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TD AS 11. 46. 6 30 - Falsifying Business Records 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-872. 
TD AS 11. 46. 660- .670 - Com.�ercial Bribe Receiving ; 
Commercial Bribery 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 708 - 8 80. 
TD AS 11. 46. 680 - Engaging in a Business Unlawfully 
This section is based on PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE 
§ 4 2 3 0 Cl 9 6 7 ) .
TD AS 1 1. 46.685-. 700 - Criminal Usury; Possession of 
Usurious Loan Records 
These sections are based on N. Y. PENAL LAW § J.90. 
40-. 45. 
CHAPTER 56 - OFFENSES AGAINST· PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
ARTICLE 3 - ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS . 1 1.56. 300-. 350 - Escape and Unlawful Evasion 
These statutes are based on AS 11. 30. 090-.095. 
TD AS 11. 56 . 360 - Attempting to Aid an Escape 
This section is based on MO. REV. STAT. § 575.230 
(�ffective January 1, 1979) . 
TD AS 1 1. 56. 370 - Criminally Negligently Permitting 
Escape 
This section is based on AS 11.30. 120 . 
TD AS 1 1.56. 380 - Promoting Contraband 
This section is based on AS 33.30.055. 
ARTICLE 4 - OFFENSES RELATING TO JUDICIAL AND OTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
TD AS 1 1.56.510, . 530 - Influencing a Witness ; 
Receiving a Bribe by a Witness 
These sections are based on HA�•7. REV. STAT. §§ 710-
1070, 1071. 
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TD AS 11. 56. 540 - Tampering with a T'Vi tness 
This section is based on HAT•7. REV. STAT. § 710-1072. 
TD AS 11.56.550, .580 - Influencing a Juror; Receiving 
a Bribe by a Juror 
These sections are based on HAtv. REV. STAT. §§ 710-
1073, 1074. 
TD AS 11.56.590 - Jury Tampering 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1075. 
TD AS 11.56.600, .605 - Misconduct by a Juror; 
Receiving Unauthorized Corrununications by a Juror 
This section is based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2808 
(effective Oct 1, 1978). 
TD AS 11.56.610 - Tampering with Physical Evidence 
This section is based on MO. REV. STAT. § 575.100 
(effective Jan 1, 1979). 
TD AS 11.56.620 - Simulating Legal Process 
This section is based on �10. REV. STAT. § 575.130 
(effective Jan 1, 1979). 
ARTICLE 5 ·- OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ADM.INISTRATION 
TD AS 11.56.700 - Resisting or Interfering with Arrest 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1026. 
TD AS 11.56.720 - Refusing to Assist a Peace Officer 
or Judicial Officer 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1011 
and AS 11.36.720. 
TD AS 11.56.730 - Refusing to Assist in an Emergency 
This section is based 6n HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1012. 
TD AS 11.56.740 - Civil Liability for Emergency Aid 
This section is based on HAW. REV. STAT § 710-1011(3)_ 
and AS 09.65.090. 
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TD AS 11.56.770-.780 - Hindering Prosecution 
These sections are based on HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 710-
1028, 1029, 1030. 
TD AS 11.56.790 - Compounding 
This section is based on �o. �EV. STAT. § 575.020 
(effective Jan 1, 1979). 
TD AS 11.56.800 - Making a False Report 
This section is based on MO. REV. STAT. § 575.080 
(effective Jan 1, 1979). 
TD AS 11.56.810 - Making a False Bomb Report 
This section is based on MO. REV. STAT. § 575.090 
(effective Jan 1, 1979). 
TD AS 11.56.830 - Impersonating a Public Servant 
This section is based on MO. REV. STAT. § 575.120 
(_effective Jan 1, 1979). 
CHAPTER 66 - OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND DECENCY 
ARTICLE 1 - PROSTITUTION AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.66.100 - Prostitution 
Th�s section is based on ORS 167.007. 
TD AS 11.66.110 - Solicitation For Purposes of 
Prostitution 
This section is based on ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3003(1) (b). 
TD AS 11.66.120; .130 - Promoting Prostitution 
These sections are based on ORS 167.012. 
TD AS ll.66.140i .150 - Compelling- Prostitution 
Th.ese sections are based on ORS 167.017. 
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TD AS 11.66.160 - Evidence Required 
This section is based on TD AS 11.56.220� 
TD AS 11.66.170 - Spouse as Witness 
This section is based on ORS 167.027 (2). 
TD AS 11.66.180 - Definitions 
The definitions are based on ORS 167. 002 (1); 167. 
002 (3); 167.002 (4). 
ARTICLE 2 - GAMBLING OFFENSES 
T!'le Code's article on gambling is based on HN·7. �EV, 
STAT § §  71-1220 to 1231. 
The definition of "gambling enterprise", TD AS 
11.66.270 (4) is taken from 18 U.S.C. § 1955. 
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APPENDIX II 
AMENDMENTS TO AUTHORIZED GAMBLING STATUTES 
in TITLE 5 
Additions in underlines 
Deletions in [CAPITAL BRACKETS] 
Sec. 1. AS 05.15.010 is amended to read: 
AS 05.15.010 ADMINISTRATION OF [DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE 
TO ADMINISTER] CHAPTER. The Department of Revenue shall 
administer this chapter. The Department of Public Safetv 
shall investigate offenses under this c�apter. 
Sec. 2. AS 05.15.060 is amended to read: 
AS 05.15.060 RULES AND REGULATIONS. In accordance 
with the Administrative Procedures Act {AS 44.62), the 
commissioner of revenue shall adopt [, NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 7, 
1960, ] rules and regulations necessary to carry out this 
chapter covering, but not limited to 
(1) the issuance, renewal, suspension and revocation of 
permits including the grounds therefor; 
{_2) a method of ascertaining net proceeds, the deter­
mination of items of expense which may be incurred or paid, 
limitations on the ratio of authorized expenses to proceeds 
and the limitation of the amount of the items of expense 
to prevent the proceeds from the activity permitted from 
being diverted to noncharitable, noneducational, nonreligious, 
or profit-making organizations, individuals or groups; 
{ 3) 
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Sec. 3. AS 05.15.070 is amended to read: 
AS 05.15.070. EXAMINATION OF [COMMISSIONER OF 
REVENUE MAY EXA�INE] PERMITTEES. (a) The Commissioner may 
examine or have examined the books and records of a permittee. 
The Commissioner may require the permittee to pay the reason­
able cost of the examination. The Commissioner may issue 
subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production 
of books, records, and other documents. 
(b) For the purpose of investigatinq violations of this 
chapter, of regulations issued under it or of Title 11, the 
department of public safety may, at all reasonable times, 
have free access to the places where the records of activities 
licensed under this chapter are kept or where conduct author­
ized by this chapter is carried on and may inspect the books 
and records, devices, tickets, cards and papers used in the 
activity. 
Sec. 4. AS 05.15.200 is amended to read: 
AS 05.15.200. PENALTIES [PENALTY]. (a) An activity 
performed in accordance with the regulations of the department 
and under a license duly issued pursuant to this chapter 
constitutes an exception to the prohibitions established 
under AS 11.66. Conduct authorized by this chapter but 
which is conducted without a valid license issued by the 
department or in a manner constituting an intentional violation 
of the regulations of the department is subject to the penalties 
provided under AS 11.66 to the full extent that the offenses 
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established in that chapter apply. 
(b) A person, not being authorized to do so under 
sec. 150 of this chapter, who knowingly shares in the net 
proceeds of an activity licensed under this chapter commits 
the crime of theft and is punishable as provided in AS 
11. 46 .130-150. 
(�) Every permittee and every officer, agent or em­
ployee of the perrnittee and every.other person or corporation 
who intentionally [WILFULLY] violates or who procures, aids 
or abets in the intentional [WILFUL] violation of this chapter 
or a regulation made under this chapter is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(d) A person who violates this chapter or a regulation 
made under this chapter or who knowingly fails or refuses to 
obey a valid order or request for inspection under sec. 70 
of this chapter is guilty of a violation. 
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AMENDMENTS TO AUTHORIZED GAMBLING 
STATUTES IN TITLE 5 
Commentary 
The prohibition of gambling activity contained in TD AS 
11.66 relates closely to the licensing and regulation of 
similar conduct under Title 5. In reviewing the application 
of Title 11 to gambling activities, certain complementary 
improvements and clarifications in Title 5 are required to 
improve the administration and enforcement of prohibitions 
supported by criminal sanction. 
Section 1. The principal problem with the existing 
statutory arrangement is confusion regarding responsibility 
for investigations of violations of law. The Department of 
Public Safety is the agency otherwise normally given this 
duty throughout government. The establishment of authority 
in the Department of Revenue to administer the licensing, 
regulatory and rule making provisions of the chapter should 
not obscure the duty of the Department of Public Safety to 
investigate matters which, because carried on outside the 
privileged area, are basically criminal in nature. 
Section 2. The reference to September 7, 1960, in 
AS 05.15.060 is stricken as an anachronism. 
The addition of a reference to "grounds" for issuance, 
renewal, suspension and revocation of permits was added to 
make clear the authority of the commissioner to define, by 
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regulation, substantive offenses for which licensing penalties 
could be imposed. The current statute, AS 05.15.060, leaves 
open for argument whether the power to issue regulations on 
these subjects applies only to the procedure under which 
these actions may be taken. It will be necessary, under the 
amended statutes, for the commissioner to make distinctions 
between more and less serious offenses, infractions and 
regulation noncompliances so that these licensing penalties 
can be applied with more precise discretion. 
"Suspension" has been added to AS 05.15.060(1) since 
suspensions are otherwise provided for in the chapter, but 
no guidance is given to the commissioner regarding a substantive 
scheme which justifies their use. 
A provision has also been added that will require the 
commissioner to publish regulations relating to limitations 
on the ratio of "authorized expenses" to "proceeds", terms 
defined in AS 05.15.160 and AS 05.15.210(13). The justification 
of allowing AS 05.15.100 to create an exception to the broad 
prohibition of gambling found in Title 11 is that the proceeds 
from these tightly regulated gambling activities go to specified 
public uses. A principal abuse of this type of program occurs 
when the game becomes more important than the objective served. 
Payroll for employees of the game and others who benefit 
from "authorized expenses'' (which does not include prizes) may 
become important enough that indirect beneficiaries become 
a controlling factor and "proceeds" beneficiaries the forgotten 
objective of the game. 
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The language added to subsection (2) of AS 05.15.060 
gives the commissioner the authority to check this abuse by 
prescribing standards setting a minimum net, stated as a 
percentage of operating costs, to be allocated to the beneficial 
use. Since the costs may vary according to the kind of game, 
its size and location, it appears preferable to let the commis­
sioner determine specific allowable limits after hearing under 
the administrative process. 
Section 3. This section in its existing form is a major 
contributing factor to the confusion regarding the role of the 
Department of Revenue in the law enforcement business with 
respect to violations of the gambling laws. While the authority 
of the Commissioner of Revenue to examine books, etc., as 
appropriate to his revenue raising and licensing authority is 
not disturbed, a subsection has been added allowing the 
Department of Public Safety to look at books, records, devices 
and papers. 
Customary provisions granting subpoena power have not 
been vested in the Commissioner of Public Safety; otherwise, 
the provision is a foreshortened version of the authority 
usually granted state agencies to examine books of financial 
institutions, (see, e.g., AS 06.20.160, granting Department of 
Commerce right to inspect books of small loan companies), to 
inspect amusement devices, sanitation facilities and other 
business aspects involving a high level of public interest. 
It should be noted that Title 5 does not provide criminal 
penalties for refusal to allow such an inspection; refusal is 
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treated as a violation, a noncriminal offense, under AS 
05.15.200(d) . Under an appropriate regulation, such a 
refusal could be the basis of a license action. When more 
serious criminal activity is involved, a search warrant may 
be procured. Note also that some violations of Title 5 may 
constitute theft. See AS 05.15.200(b). 
The provision for access to places and records is likely 
to have a beneficial effect, apart from preventing violations 
of the act, in encouraging operator honesty with the public 
in the management of licensed activities. 
Section 4. Subsection 4(a) has been added to emphasize 
that legally conducted activities licensed under Title 5 
are a specific exception to the gambling prohibitions contained 
in the Code and that in the absence of a legally conducted 
licensed activity, gambling prohibitions of Title 11 apply. 
This provision makes explicit what is now provided in an 
attorney general's opinion regarding the exceptional nature 
of AS 05.15. See 1960 Op. Att'y Gen., No. 8 (Alaska, 1960). 
Subsection 4(b} is intended to make "skimming" a form of 
theft. There is some question now whether skimming condoned 
by management authority can be treated more severely (except 
as tax evasion where unreported) than license violations. 
This provision treats skimming as a form of theft similar 
to theft from trust funds. If the amount skimmed exceeds 
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$500, such conduct would be punishable under TD AS 11.46 .130, 
theft in the first degree, as a class C felony. 
Subsection 4 (c) parallels the existing penalty section 
of the chapter and adds violation of regulations as a class B 
misdemeanor. The culpable mental state of ''intentionally" 
replaces ''wilfully" to comply with Code nomenclature. 
Subsection 4 (d) was added to provide additional sanction 
for violations of thea::::t or regulations under it that are 
not intentional. It also adds teeth to departmental orders 
that do not have the full effect of regulations and provides 
this most limited sanction for unreasonably denying inspection 
of premises and records. 
Under its grant of authority to regulate, the Commissioner 
of Revenue will also have the authority to categorize conduct 
of this type as an additional ground for sanction by way of 
licensing action. 
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